University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
2011

Whither Secular Bear: The Russian Orthodox Church’s
Strengthening Influence on Russia's Domestic and Foreign Policy
Robert Blitt

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

Legal Studies Research Paper Series

Research Paper #173
March 2012

Whither Secular Bear: The Russian Orthodox Church’s
Strengthening Influence on Russia’s Domestic and Foreign
Policy

Robert C. Blitt

This paper can be downloaded without charge
from the Social Science Research Network Electronic library at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2008331

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2008331

WHITHER SECULAR BEAR:
THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 'S STRENGTHENING
INFLUENCE ON RUSSIA'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY

I.

INTRODUCTION

s 2012 presidential elections in Russia draw near, evidence points to a collapse in
that country's constitutional obligation of secularism and state-church separation. Although early signs of this phenomenon can be traced back to the Yeltsin era,
the Putin and Medvedev presidencies have dealt a fatal blow to secular state policy
manifested both at home and abroad, as well as to Russia's constitutional human
rights principles including nondiscrimination and equality of religious beliefs. The
first part of this article argues that leadership changes in the Russian government and
the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)2 have triggered an unprecedented deepening
of state-ROC ties manifested by a number of key domestic "breakthroughs" for the
Church, including bestowing its long-coveted prizes of access to the public education system and the military.
But this is only half the story. In addition to encroachment on domestic state
policy, the second part of this article illustrates that the ROC has been actively
participating in shaping and executing Russia's foreign policy not only in the "near
abroad" specifically, but more generally across the European continent and beyond.
By welcoming this exclusive ROC function, the government has enabled a paradoxical situation whereby a secular state openly advocates on behalf of Orthodoxy and
"traditional" values abroad. This ensuing relationship not only generates deleterious
implications for the content of international human rights law, but also serves to
reinforce the already deficient human rights situation within Russia, thus further
widening the rift between constitutional promise and government practice.
In the face of these developments, the ROC today enjoys unprecedented influence on virtually every aspect of Russian government policy, an arrangement that
coincides with the vision set out by the Moscow Patriarchate in its Bases of the Social
Concept. More immediately in the context of 20 12 presidential elections, this favored
treatment has positioned the Church to reap further dividends given its de facto role
in validating the government's legitimacy. From this vantage point, an explicit return
to Putinocracy promises continued disdain on the part of the Kremlin and ROC for

A

1
Robert C. Blitt, B.A. magna cum laude, McGill Un iversity, M.A., J.D. , LL.M., University of Totonto, is an Associate Professor of Law, University ofTen nessee College of Law, Knoxville, Tennessee.
2
The terms Russian Orthodox C hurch, RO C, Russ ian Church, the C hurch, and Orthodox Church are used imerchangeably herein to refer to the Moscow Patriarchate.
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freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, as well as freedom of expression and related human rights, in the domestic and international arena alike.

II.

A RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH "No LONGER POWERLESS
AND WEAK" AT HOME

During Vladimir Putin's first two terms as president, most of the informed
opinion concerning Russian government-ROC dealings agreed that the relationship
undercut Russia's official constitutional secularism, with the ROC gaining influence
and state support for the church growing stronger. 3 1his situation continued until
March 2008, when presidential candidate Dmitry Medvedev scored an "overwhelming victory" in an election described as "more coronation than contest." 4 At this
point, preliminary signs indicated that Medvedev would continue President Putin's
relationship with the Church. 5 However, no one could have predicted that Alexy II,
leader of the Russian Orthodox Church for nearly two decades, would die less than
one year later and leave the position of ROC Patriarch an open race. 6
Upon learning of the Patriarch's demise, Medvedev, abroad in India and only
seven months into his presidency, dramatically canceled a planned visit to Italy and
returned forthwith to Russia.? A Kremlin statement described Alexy's death as a
"very grievous event .. .in the life of this country, our society." 8 As if to emphasize the
point, Medvedev swiftly declared Alexy's funeral a day of national mourning, 9 signed
a decree requiring cultural institutions and television and radio stations to "cancel
entertainment events and programs on the day of the patriarch's burial," 10 and ordered national media to provide live coverage of the almost eight-hour long funeral
ceremony. 11
Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, the ROC's locum tenens
(interim leader), eulogized the departed Patriarch at a funeral service attended by
Medvedev, Putin, and other officials from the Kremlin and Duma: "Today his Holi3 See Zoe Knox, The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate's Post-Soviet Leadership, 55 EUR.-ASIA STUD.
575, (2003), John Anderson, Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?, 61]. INT'L
AFF. 185, (2007), Oleg Shchedrov, Putin Promises Support to Russian Orthodox Church, REUTERS, Nov. 19,
2007, Robert C. Blitt, How to Entrench a De Facto State Church in Russia, 2008 BYU L. REV. 707, Clifford].
Levy, At Expense of All Others, Putin Picks a Church, N .Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, at AI, A New Patriarch for the
Russian Orthodox Church, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 2009, Russia-Media Say Church Divided
on Choice of Patriarch, U.S. OPEN SOURCE CTR., Jan. 23, 2009 [hereinafter Media Say Church Divided], and
Tony Halpin, Russian Orthodox Church Choses [sic] Between 'ex-KGB Candidates' as Patriarch, TIMES ONLINE
(London) , Jan. 26, 2009.
4 Peter Finn, Putin's Chosen Successor, Medvedev, Elected in Russia, Wash. Post, Mar. 3, 2008, at All .
'Blitt, supra note 3, at 773-78.
6
Yuri Zarakhovich, RttSsian Ortho®x Church Loses Its Leader, Time, Dec. 5, 2008.
7 Sophia Kishkovsky, Patriarch Aleksy II, Russian Orthodox Leader, Dies at Age 79, N .Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2008, at
A19.
8
Halpin, supra note 3.
9 Sophia Kishkovsky, Russian Leadm Attend Patriarchs Funeral, N.Y. Times, Dec. I 0, 2008, at Al6.
10
Media Say Church Divided, supra note 3; see also Yulia Taratuta & Pavel Korobov, RttSsian Church to Elect New
Patriarch, Kommersant (Moscow), Dec. 8, 2008, at I (discussing Alexy's political legacy).
11
Alexander Osipovich, Russia Buries First Post-Communist Church Leader, AFP, Dec. 10, 2008.
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ness, standing before the face of God, can say that he left us with a different Church:
no longer powerless and weak." 12 Press accounts concluded that the ceremony
signaled "the elevation of the Russian Orthodox Church to de-facto state religion." 13
After Alexy's burial, the Church Council turned to the task of electing a new patriarch. Kirill, despite his conspicuous position as locum tenens, was by many accounts
not a shoo-in for the revered post in part because of criticism he was too "liberal". 14
Nevertheless, the Metropolitan-after a flurry of speculation and jockeying amid
the candidates-secured election as the 16th Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.
To cement the vote, on February 1, 2009, Russian President Medvedev and Prime
Minister Putin, alongside other government officials, 15 waited with bated breath in
Moscow's Christ the Savior Cathedral, as bells chimed for fifteen minutes before
Kirill arrived in a limousine for his enthronement ceremony. 16 Like Alexy's funeral,
Russian television provided live coverage of the ceremony. Although Putin did not
give a speech, he and other dignitaries queued up to congratulate the new Patriarch
and for the opportunity to kiss Kirill's crucifix. 17 Svetlana Medvedeva, Russia's First
Lady, was first in line to receive communion from Kirill. 18
In a speech delivered after his enthronement, Patriarch Kirill offered thanks to
Putin and Medvedev. 19 President Medvedev declared the enthronement:
an outstanding event in the life of our country and of all Orthodox nations-an event that opens a new chapter in the development of Orthodox religion in our country, and which, hopefully, creates new conditions
for a fully-fledged and solidarity dialogue between the Russian Orthodox
Church and the state. 20
As if to demonstrate his commitment to fostering these "new conditions,"
Medvedev invited the newly enthroned Patriarch-as his first duty as head of the
ROC-to lead a service in the Kremlin's Assumption Cathedral.2 1 At a reception in
Georgy Hall for ROC Local Council delegates following the service, both Kirill and
Medvedev addressed the assembled clergy. 22 Medvedev's speech stressed that
relations between church and state are built on the foundation of the
constitutional principles of freedom of conscience and worship and non12

Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alexy II Laid to Rest, RIA Novosti (Moscow) , Dec. 9, 2008.
E.g., Osipovich, supm note II.
Media Say Church Divided, supra note 3. E.g., Halpin, supra note 3.
15
Sophia Kishkovsky, Russian Leaders Attend Installation of Orthodox Patriarch, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2009, at AS.
16
Russian Orthodox Church Enthrones New Patriarch, Radio Free Eur./Rad io Liberty (Feb. I , 2009).
17
Rmsian Orthodox Church Enthrones New Patriarch, AFP, Jan 3 1, 2009.
18
Leonid Sevastyanov & Robert Moynihan, I 00 Days ofPatriarch Kirill, Moscow Times, May 18, 2009.
19
RIISsian Orthodox Church Enthrones New Patriarch, supra note 17.
20
Medvedev: Kirill's Enthronement Creates New Setting for Broader Dialogue Between Church and State, lnterfax
(Moscow) , Feb. I , 2009 [hereinafter Dialogue Berween Church and State].
21
Kirill Cond ucts First Duty as Patriarch, RT, Feb. 2, 2009.
22
Russian Orthodox Church Enthrones New Patriarch, wpra note 17. Georgy Hall is the largest and most ceremonial
room within the Kremlin compound.
l3
14
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intervention by the state authorities in religious organisations' activities,
and at the same time, on the state authorities' recognition of the Church's
great contribution to building Russia's statehood, developing its national
culture and affirming spiritual and moral values in society. 23
Although Medvedev acknowledged that the Constitution provides for freedom
of conscience and separation of religious associations from the state, he conspicuously omitted mention of Article 14's affirmation that the "Russian Federation shall
be a secular state" and religious associations "shall be equal before the law." 24 In
essence, Medvedev's myopic and selective pronouncement on church-state relations
cast aside constitutional principles in favor of the malleable mortar of "the Church's
great contribution to building Russia's statehood"-a contribution that has no basis
or authority in operative Russian law.
Faced with the death of one patriarch and the election of another during his first
year in office, President Medvedev missed two major opportunities to redefine the
controversial church-state relationship charted during Putin's previous two terms.
Rather than begin to remedy the profound infidelity to Russia's constitutional touchstone of secular rule, Medvedev's management of church-state relations in the era
of Patriarch Kirill has further weakened Russia's rule of law and widened the chasm
between constitutional promise and practice. Although some examples of this conduct might strike the casual observer as quaint or trivial, when added to the context
of more significant policy concessions, the emerging picture underscores a burgeoning relationship between Orthodoxy and the state which effectively displaces secular
rule, forecloses the possibility of all religious groups benefitting from the promise of
nondiscrimination, and undermines Russian respect for fundamental human rights.
PREFERENTIAL ROC TREATMENT IN THREE ANECDOTES
Three revealing if seemingly innocuous examples of preferential ROC treatment
set the tone for larger concessions to the Church on more sensitive policy issues.
First, consider the coveted migalki or flashing light affixed to the Patriarch's automobile. Under a 2006 government decree, fewer than one thousand Russian cars
belonging to senior government officials were supposed to be equipped with special
flashing lights intended to facilitate bypassing traffic when "absolutely necessary." 25
Yet Patriarch Kirill, despite the fact that he is not considered a government official,
has been extended this privilege to the exclusion of other religious leaders, including

A.

23
President Omitry Medvedev, Speech at a Receptio n Given by the President of Russia in Honour of Senior C lergy
Who Took Part in the Russ ian Orthodox Church Local Council (Feb. 2, 2009).
24
Konst.RF art. 14.
25 Alexander Bratersky, Angry Drivers Take Stand Against Flashing Blue Lights, Moscow Times, Apr. 6, 2010.
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representatives from Russia's so-called traditional religions.26 During public debates
over the omnipresent miga!ki-sparked in part due to related traffic fatalities-Yuri
Luzhkov, the now sacked Mayor of Moscow, asserted that only three individuals
were worthy of the blue light: "the President, the Prime Minister, and the patriarch
of the Orthodox Church." 27
In the second instance, when the Patriarch-flashing blue lights and all-needs
to escape Moscow's temporal but ever-vexing traffic jams, he too needs a dacha
getaway. Construction of a new summer residence near the Black Sea resort town of
Gelendzhik commenced during Alexy's tenure, following an unusual land grant from
the mayor of the village. A travel guide describes this up-market and idyllic location
as an ostensibly protected nature reserve boasting fantastic air, which has become all
the rage of Russia's new elite.28 To execute the grant of protected forestland to the
ROC, the local government openly flaunted federal law permitting removal of protected status only in exceptional cases 29 limited to where the state or municipality is
implementing "international commitments of the Russian Federation," or acting for
a purpose of "state or local significance in the absence of other options." 30 It is not
immediately obvious how the transfer of protected land to the Church might fulfill
the narrow requirements stipulated under the law, or how such a move could occur
without public consultation. At least one individual present at a town hall meeting
protested the fact that the Patriarch's residence was proceeding without any environmental impact study: "We are present at a farce. Everything has already been put up,
so what are we discussing? And how could a three story building appear without an
ecological expert test?"3 1 Despite these issues, the local prosecutor's office maintained
that "there was no violation" of the applicable law. 32
26
Bratersky, supra note 51. For more on the division between "traditional" and "nontraditional" religions in Russia,
see Blitt, mpra note 3, at 73 1-3 5; Wallace L. Daniel & Christopher Marsh, Russia's 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience in Context and Retrospect, 49 J. Church & St. 5 (2007); ArinaLekhel, Leveling the Playing Fieldfor Religious
''Liberty" in Rwsia: A Critical Analysis of the 1991 Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations," 32 Van d.
J. Transnat'l L. 167 (1 999).
27
Shaun Walker, Flashing Light Traffic Dodge Leaves Moscow's Motorists Screaming Blue Murder, Independent
(London), Apr. 2 1, 2010, at 30; Ruslan Krivobok, Russian Drivers Protest Cars with Flashing Lights Breaking Road
Rules, RIA Novosti, Apr. 15, 2010.
28
Andreas Sternfeldt & Bodo Thons, Die russische Schwarzmeerkiiste: Unterwegs zwischen Sotschi und Anapa
(Trescher-Reihe Reisen, 2005).
29
Zemelnyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Z K) [Land Code] art. I01(3) (Russ.) (repealed 2006) ( "l13'h5ITI>Ie
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IlyTMHY B rr naB K ax [To Putin in Swimwear], Novaya Gazeta(Moscow), July I , 2009.
30
Zemelnyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Z K] [Land Code] art. 49(1) ("l1 3'h5ITI>I e , B TOM ~ M cne rry TeM
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T itov, supra note 29.
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Lastly, Russia's Federal Court Marshals Service recently inked a deal with the
Church whereby ROC priests nationwide will denounce the failure to repay debts,
including "men dodging their alimony payments," 33 in sermons and during private
meetings with debtors organized by court marshals.34 Russia's Chief Bailiff, Artur
Parfenchikov, observed that the ROC "will exercise spiritual influence over the
debtors to teach them about the unacceptabiliry of living in debt."35According to another spokesperson for the Marshals, "[p]riests will say that unpaid debt is the same
as theft in Christianiry." 36 While the global economic crisis might justifY extreme
measures, this is not the first time the ROC and state have mixed sermonizing with
public policy. In December 2008, priests preached to unsuspecting scofflaws flagged
down by traffic police,37 despite the fact that Article 4( 4) of Russia's 1997 Law on
Freedom of Conscience-passed at the behest of the ROC-mandates that:
The activiry of agencies of state power and ... local administration [shall]
not [be] accompanied by publicreligious rites and ceremonies. Officials
of state power, or of other state agencies, or of agencies of local administration, as well as military figures, [shall] not have the right to use their
official status for advancing one or another religious affiliation. 38
One reaction to the developments outlined above may be: "So what? Flashing
lights and a land grant do not establish a state church or even pose a challenge to the
principle of secularism." From this perspective, any benefits-even those handed out
exclusively to the ROC-are more quaint than illustrative of a breakdown in Russia's
constitutional principles of secularism and equaliry for all religions. However, the
realiry is more complicated and troubling. In practice, these examples demonstrate
a consistent and pervasive pattern of special treatment for the ROC, carried over
and enlarged under Medvedev's rule. In addition, each instance carries potentially
negative implications for upholding respect for Russia's Constitution. For example,
flashing lights for the Patriarch's car are problematic not only as discriminatory
against other religions, but also as an erosion of the government's separation from
religious associations. Likewise, the issues arising from a cost-free grant of federally
protected land for a summer residence raise red flags concerning preferential treatment and the flaunting of constitutional and federal law. It is even more troubling
to consider what consequences might follow from blending the coercive force of the
33

Russian Orthodox Priests to Help 'Shame' Debtors, AFP, June 24, 2009.
Natalya Krainova, Church Calls on Debtors to Repay or Face Hell, St. Petersburg Times, June 26, 2009. The Moscow Patriarchate's department on cooperation with military forces and law enforcement agencies brokered the deal.
34

!d.
35 Russian Orthodox Priests to Help 'Shame' Debtors, supra note 33.
36
Krainova, supra note 34. Reports indicate that the Marshals are in talks to sign similar agreements with Muslim
and Buddhist religious leaders as well. !d.
37 Priests, Cops Fight Traffic Violation, AFP, Dec. 4.
38 0 Svobode Sovesti i o Religioznikh Objedinenijah [O n the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations],
an. 4(4) , Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation]
1997, No. 39, Item 4465 (Federal Law No. 125- FZ) [hereinafter 1997 Law].
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state (embodied in the traffic cop or court bailiff) with the Orthodox priesthood.
The agent of a specific religious denomination walking in lockstep with an agent of
the state in the course of cartying out state functions presents a clear challenge to the
constitutional obligation of secularism, but it also forces a citizen-whether nonbeliever, Protestant, Catholic, or Mormon-into an uncomfortable situation in which
a specific religious point of view appears to be sanctioned by the governing authority. Russia's Constitution specifically guarantees that "[n]obody shall be forced to
express his thoughts and convictions or to deny them."39 However, if an Orthodox
priest, with a police officer standing at his side, hurls Orthodox dogma at a driver
for running an amber light, the driver could foreseeably be placed in such a position.
Moreover, simply duplicating the practice with Buddhist monks or Muslim imams
does nothing to relieve this burden on freedom from coercion or to correct the ensuing inequality and government endorsement of one or more select religions.
As Nikolai Mitrokhin has observed, "Kirill has already received more from
Medvedev than [Patriarch Alexy II] got from Putin during his whole presidency."40
Yet, in the Patriarch's mind these mere perquisites-not unlike the Putin-era practice
of government institutions adopting patron saints and official prayers, and building churches within state owned structures 41 -are indicative only of an innocuous
church-state "partnership" and "fruitful cooperation." 42 According to Kirill, the "absence of such agreements with certain other religious organizations active in Russia is
not evidence of discrimination."43 In the face of this favoritism "lite", some observers,
Mitrokhin included, have maintained that Kirill's influence reaches "over a very narrow sphere-education, culture, spirituality-but not more than this." 44 Similarly,
Irina Papkova writing in 2008 concluded that the ROC is "unable to exercise real
social or political influence ... at least where it concerns the federal plane of Russian
life."45
Kirill himself has expressed revulsion at the slightest implication that the ROC
might enjoy anything approaching the status of an official chun;:h . Writing in 2005
to then U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Kirill demurred that there "are
39

Konst. RF art. 29(3).
Brian Whitmore, Russias Patriarch Increasingly Becoming Major Fo rce in Politics, Radio Free Eur./Radio Liberty
(Sep. 6, 2009).
41
Blitt, sttpra note 3, at 740-4 1.
42 Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, ITpe,!1CT05ITenb PyccKoi1
40

ITpaeoc naeHoi1 U ep~ew rro3,11paewn ITpe3M,l1eHTa Poccww ~. A . Me,!1Be,l1eB a c ,[\HeM
POJK,l1eHw5I
IP';""" of the Rwsian Orthodox Church Congratulates President ofRussia Dmitry Medvedev on his Birthday] Sept. 14,
2009.
43
Letter from Metropolitan Kirill ofSmolensk and Kaliningrad to Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State (Dec. 6,
2005) [hereinafter Letter from Kirill] .
44
Whitmore, sttpra note 40.
45
Irina Papkova, The Orthodox Church and Civil Society in Russia, and: Russian Society and the Orthodox
Church: Religion in Russia after Communism, and: Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov': Sovremennoe sostoianie i
aktual'nye problemy [The Russian Orthodox Church: Contemporary Condition and Current Problems], 9 Kritika:
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 48 1, 483,485 (2008).
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absolutely no grounds" to make such an assertion because ROC "clergy do not participate in the work of the state organs or political parties and movements," and the
Church operates without state funding of religious activity.46
From the present vantage point, however, the above conclusions and assertions
down playing the extent of the ROC's influence on Russian government policy
appear dubious at best. Examining developments in matters of greater gravitas-including education, the military, and foreign policy-it becomes untenable, even
disingenuous, to profess that the clergy do not participate in the work of the state
organs or that the Church operates without state funding. This underlying reality
confirms two things: first, that the Church is successfully advancing a wide-ranging
legislative and policy vision that extends beyond the narrow confines identified by
Mitrokhin (which in any event already challenges Russia's constitutional order) . And
second, that the Medvedev government has little regard for safeguarding separation
of church and state or upholding human rights in Russia.

B.

BREAKING THE ROC'S DOMESTIC GLASS CEILING
Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev's open-ended vision of "noninterference" in the
context of church-state relations is instructive for framing the extent of the ROC's
growing political muscularity:

.

And this is what we call noninterference: We on our side do not interfere .. . into concrete political affairs. Which does not mean that the
Church does not express views on various political and social issues. On
the contrary, the Church is free to explore not only purely theological or
moral themes, but also themes related to history, related to present political situations, [and] to the future. And this is what I call noninterferenceY
The doctrine of "non-interference" is mirrored in the nonexhaustive list of areas
for church-state cooperation enumerated in the ROC's Bases ofthe Social Concept.48
One of these areas where the Church has tirelessly pursued the opportunity to
express its views is access to Russia's military. Kirill has addressed elements of Russia's
military on numerous occasions. In Severodvinsk, Russia's largest military shipyard,
he called upon workers to harness Orthodox Christian values to reinforce Russia's
defense capabilities: "You should not be ashamed of going to church and teaching
the Orthodox faith to your children . .. Then we shall have something to defend with
our missiles." 49 On a separate visit to Russian sailors stationed in Sevastopol, the
headquarters for Russia's Black Sea Fleet, Kirill stressed the need to offer spiritual
support to the military: "For warriors to be capable of [sacrificing their lives], we
46

Letter/rom Kirilf, supra note 43.
Russian A rchbishop Describes Limits ofNonintelftrence in Church-State Ties, Ria Novosti (Sept. 18, 2009). Hilarion
replaced Kirill as head of the Moscow Patriarchate's external relations department foll owing Kirill's election to
Patriarch.
48
See Russ ian Orthodox Church, The Bases of the Social Concept [hereinafter Bases of the Social Concept).
49 Whitmore, sup ra note 40
47
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must support them with our prayers, while clergymen should be working with the
armed forces." 50 In another ceremony held at the Strategic Missile Forces Academy
in Moscow, Patriarch Kirill presented the Commander of the Missile Forces with
a banner emblazoned with the image of the Holy Great Martyr Barbara. 51 Kirill
opined that "such dangerous weapon [sic] can be given only to clean hands-hands
of people with clear mind, ardent love to Motherland, responsibility for their work
before God and people." 52 The Patriarch also reminded the audience that the Church
had been teaching Orthodox culture at the Academy for thirteen years and that over
1,600 officers and members of their families had graduated from that program. 53
These episodes, with their heady mix of military hardware and Orthodox
pageantry, further complicate the entanglement of church and state. Under Putin,
practices including the ble-ssing of the President's nuclear launch code briefcase and
the sprinkling of holy water by a ROC priest on a S-400 Triumph surface-to-air
missile system during a ceremony broadcast on national television became commonplace, ostensibly to strengthen statehood and state security. Remarkably, despite
the Church's vehement objection to "consecrat[ing] places that can serve a 'double
purpose' and establishments directly or indirectly encouraging sin," 54 no high-level
ROC priest has objected to sanctifYing weapons of mass destruction 55 or the successor agency to the KGB, the institution responsible for defiling and laying waste to
the Church under Soviet rule.
More troubling still, this comingling of church and military has reached new
heights under Medvedev's rule. In 2009, the president announced his intention to
support on "an ongoing basis the work of chaplains from our traditional Russian
faiths in our Armed Forces." 56 This sea change in policy-pursued by the ROC during the eight years of Putin's rule but never officially attained 57-signals a dramatic
deepening of the church-state relationship. In Medvedev's view, the new chaplaincy
program is intended to "help strengthen the moral and spiritual foundations of
[Russian] society," as well its "multiethnic and multireligious" unity. 58 However,
50

51
52
53

Roger McDermott, Medvedev "Sanctifies" the Russian Army, Eurasia Daily Moni_tor, Aug. 17, 2009.
Patriarch Kirill Awarded Strategic Missile Forces to St. Barbara Pennant,: Interfax, Dec. 8, 2009.

!d.
!d.

54

Patriarch Kirill Believes It Unacceptable to Consecrate Nightclubs and Restaurants, Inter fax, Dec. 23, 2009. For Kirill,
places that can serve a "double purpose" appear limited to "night clubs, discos, restaurants, [and] shops selling dubious production." !d.
55 For example, when asked whether he thought it was inappropriate for the Church to bless "all kinds of weapons,"
Kirill replied, "[p]riests do that when they are asked." Interview with Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Kyrill [sic}: 'The
Bible Calls it a Sin,' Spiegel Online Int'l, Jan. 10, 2008.
56
President Dmitry Medvedev, Opening Remarks at Meeting on Teaching the Fundamentals of Religious Culture
and Secular Ethics in Schools, and the Introduction of a Chaplains Institute in the Armed Forces Uuly 21, 2009)
[hereinafter Medvedev Opening Remarks].
57 Even prior to Medvedev's formal approval of military chaplains, over 2,000 Orthodox priests ministered to
soldiers on a voluntary, unofficial basis. Blitt, mpra note 3, at 741. This allowed for a situation whereby " (o]nly the
Orthodox clergy [were] entitled to give ecclesiastic guidance to the military." Zarakhovich, sttpra note 6.
58
Medvedev Opening Remarks, supra note 56.
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some critics of the program have voiced concern that the ROC is better-situated
than other "traditional" faiths to capitalize on state-sanctioned access to the military,
in part because of its "nationwide infrastructure of seminaries and colleges to train
priests" for missionary work, something the Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist faiths
do not share.59 This head start has in turn prompted concern that members of the
military who adhere to other faiths will either go without spiritual care or be led to
Orthodoxy as a more accessible alternative. 60
Even if the three other "traditional" religious groups manage to train and field
their own chaplains, the state is poised to reject their admission into the military.
The terms governing the chaplaincy program require adherents of a "traditional" religious faith to account for 10 percent of a military unit before the state will authorize
an official chaplain.61According to a recent Russian Defense Ministry survey, 83 percent of soldiers identifying themselves as religious adherents are Orthodox. 62 Based
on this official government statistic, it appears unlikely that any of the "traditional"
religious minorities will be able to satisfy the 10 percent per unit bar with any regularity.63 Coincidentally, the 10 percent hurdle endorsed by Medvedev marries well
with the ROC's desire to retain a monopoly-or at least a very tightly guarded oligopoly-over access to the Russian military. As early as 1995, the Moscow Patriarchate told military officials that if its access to the armed services could not be exclusive,
only Muslim clerics should be tolerated, and no other religions should be permitted
to "penetrate" fighting units. 64
Patriarch Kirill, a longstanding advocate of inserting Orthodox clergy into Russia's military, was quick to praise Medvedev's plan to admit clergy into the ranks of
the military. Shortly after the President's historic proclamation, Defense Minister
Anatoly Serdyukov announced that he would "hire up to 250 clerics and would pay
their salaries." 65 By December 2009, thirty ROC priests were already selected, and
some dispatched, to serve at Russian military bases, including in the North Cauca59 Robert Parsons, Russia: Muslims Oppose Bill to Add Chaplains to Army, Radio Free Eur./Radio Liberty (Mar.
17, 2006); Paul Goble, Muslim Faithful Outnumber Orthodox Believers in Russian Military District, World Sec.
Nerwork (Feb. 19, 2010).
60
See Training Centers to Prepare Priests for Russian Army, RIA Novosti, Feb. 2, 20 I 0, (reporting that 83 percent
of servicemen identif}r as Orthodox Christians, and noting Medvedev's support for "a project to restore full-scale
military priesthood"); Goble, supra note 59 (discussing the possibility that the percentage of Orthodox Christian
servicemen is significantly lower than what the government reports).
6 1 U .S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2010, at 276 (2010).
62
!d. "The Armed Forces Sociological Center says more than 70% of Russia's military personnel consider themselves
religious. About 80% of them identif}r themselves as Orthodox Christians, about 13% as Muslims, about 3% as
Buddhists, and 4% as followers of other faiths." Orthodox Church to Appoint 400 Priests as Military Chaplains, Interfax, Feb. 3, 20 I 0.
63 According to one critic, "Most likely, everybody, other than Russian Orthodox parishioners, will be having a
problem. I doubt even the Muslims will number the required 10%." Anatoly Pchelintsev, Religious Strife May Hit the
Army, Def. & Sec. (Rus.), Feb. 3, 2010.
64 Zoe Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia After Communism 125 (2005).
65 Nabi Abdullaev, Medvedev Backs More Religion in Class, Army, Moscow Times, July 22, 2009; see also Orthodoxy
and Other Faiths to Be Taught in Russian Schools Voluntarily, !tar-Tass (Moscow), July 22, 2009 (noting events and
policies that may lead to greater religious discrimination) .
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sus. 66 The state, therefore, is now paying the ROC directly for its religious activities,
and the ROC's priests, in turn, have become agents of the state. 67 Notably, much of
the development of the chaplain system is taking place by administrative decree, outside formal legislative channels. This procedure has given rise to concerns over the
implementation of the framework that will govern rights and obligations of clergy,
their responsibilities, and their competences. 68 For its part, the Church reportedly is
preparing "a textbook of Orthodox Christian culture for conscript servicemen" and
is developing methods for counteracting the "penetration of totalitarian sects, especially neo-pagans, to the army." 69
Putting aside the 10 percent rule for "traditional" faiths and the methods used to
implement the program, the most troubling aspect of the military chaplain program
stems from its confirmation that the preambulary distinction between "traditional"
and "nontraditional" faiths contained in the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience
has become the law of the land.7° As a consequence of this distortion, the President
is able to freely divide religious groups into three tiers, with each assigned a distinct
degree of privilege or lack thereof: first, the Russian Orthodox Church; second, the
other "traditional" faiths, which are afforded the opportunity to operate with the
blessing of the government, at least on paper; 71 and finally, the so-called nontraditional faiths, which are saddled with government-sanctioned barriers of discrimination that obstruct the ability to practice faith and service communities freely and
equally. By giving legal effect to the distinction between "traditional" and "nontraditional" religious groups under Russia's plan for military chaplains, the program
facially discriminates against certain religions without anything more than a preambulary reference as the basis for establishing such a distinction in the first instance.
As currently implemented, the program goes beyond what President Putin permitted
and stands in stark contradiction to the Constitution's guarantees of equality, nondiscrimination, and freedom of religion.
Church access to the public education system represents a second long-coveted
area where Medvedev has seen fit to extend the ROC's influence. During his address
announcing the military chaplain program, the president endorsed teaching the

66

Russia Restores Full-Scale Military Priesthood, RIA Novosti, Dec. 8, 2009.
To underscore the increasingly common phenomenon of state funding of the ROC's activities, consider the $150
million price tag associated with building a new ROC church in Paris and plans underway to authorize government
funding for ROC parishes engaged in efforts to prevent abortions and "support ... young families on a priority
basis." Russian Religious Organizations Likely to Gain Right for State Help, lnterfax, Feb. 17, 20 I 0.
68
Open Letter from the Slavic Center for Law & Justice and the Institute of Religion & Law, to the Minister of
Defense.
69
Igor Yegorov, Priests Will Be Drafted into the Russian Army?, Def. & Sec., Feb. 3, 2010.
7
For.additional discussion on the impact of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience, see Blitt, supra note 3, at
67

°

733-34.
71

For example, the U.S Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has reported "Russian authorities rarely allow Islam ic services in the military and often deny Muslim conscripts time for daily prayers or alternatives to pork-based meals." U.S. Comm'n on lnt'l Religious Freedom, Annual Report 20 11 , 291.
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fundamentals of religious culture and secular ethics in Russia's schools. 72 1he ROC
has for many years advocated introducing such a course, as an opportunity to infuse
the state's educational curriculum with traditional Orthodox values. In the official
view of the Church,
it is desirable that the entire educational system should be built on religious principles and based on Christian values .... The danger of occult
and neo-heathen influences and destructive sects penetrating into the
secular school should not be ignored either, as under their impact a child
can be lost for himself, for his family and for society. 73
In vowing to allow religious instruction in public schools, Medvedev stated that
the new educational program would adhere to "fundamental constitutional provisions at every stage." 74 However, implementation of the program is being driven by
input from the representatives of only designated traditional religions/ 5 thus omitting from the outset all other so-called nontraditional faiths. Moreover, Medvedev's
promise that "every legislative act in this area will have to be appraised by experts" 76
offers little assurance for compliance with constitutional or human rights norms because Russia's record is mixed at best when it comes to employing "experts" to reach
"objective" decisions.7 7
Even if the pilot program currently being implemented in 19 regions under
the banner "The basics of religious cultures and secular ethics" 78 proves capable of
providing adequate accommodation to students from religious minorities, based on
the current discourse and track record of previous efforts such as the "Foundations
of the Orthodox Culture" course/9 national deployment seems fated to generate another fault line of inequality and discrimination for religious minorities and nonbe72

Medvedev Opening Remarks, supra note 56.
Bases ofthe Social Concept, supra note 48, art. 14(3).
74
Medvedev Opening Remarks, supra note 56.
73

75Jd.
76 Jd.
77 For example, in February 2009, the Justice Ministry established an Expert Religious Studies Council. The U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) reported that this Council has "wide powers to recommend investigations of religious groups during the registration procedure, to assess if a registered community's activity is in accord with its charter, and to ascertain if an organization, one of its members, or the literature it produces
or distributes is extremist." Yet, the Council is chaired by Aleksandr Dvorkin, an individual who lacks academic
credentials as a religion specialist and is known as "Russia's most prominent 'anti-cult' activist." Other members of
the Council include five ROC-affiliated individuals known for their "anti-sect" activities and attacks on the Protestant faith . U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, supra note XX, at 181-182 and 279.
78
Press release, Public council discussed the first results of approbation of complex educational course "Basics of
religious cultures and secular ethics", Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Oct. 14, 2010,
http:l/eng.mon.gov.ru/press/release/4291/. Six courses are being offered under the program: Basics of Orthodox culture; Basics of Islamic culture; Basics of Buddhist culture; Basics of Judaic culture; Basics of world religious cultures;
and Basics of secular ethics.
79 See, for example, Svetlana Osadchuk, Schoolboy Takes Unorthodox Stand, Moscow Times, Nov. 13, 2007, Anastasiya Lebedev, Lesson in Nativity Cards and the Constitution, Moscow Times, Sept. 25, 2006, and Geraldine Fagan,
Patchy Local Provision of Orthodox Culture Classes, Forum 18 News Service, Sept. 25, 2007.
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Uevers.so Moreover, it is unlikely the ROC will abandon efforts to further influence
the emerging curriculum if their desired outcome is not forthcoming. 81 According to
Metropolitan Hilarion, "[t]he time has come for the monopoly of Darwinism and
the deceptive idea that science in general contradicts religion. These ideas should be
left in the past ... Darwin's theory remains a theory. This means it should be taught
to children as one of several theories, but children should know of other theories
too."B2 In addition, the ROC continues to advocate that all students-regardless of
religious persuasion-be required to study to the specifics of "Orthodox culture" in
some standalone framework: "the rising generation of citizens cannot fail to have
basic notions of.. .icon painting, church architecture, and the historical path of the
Orthodox Church." 83

III. THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AS A LYNCHPIN IN
RUSSIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY AND QyEST FOR RESTORED
SUPERPOWER STATUS
The policies discussed above represent significant "concessions from the secular
government that [Kirill's] predecessors had been trying to obtain for years." 84 But
they are by no means the only concessions. Turning to the foreign policy arena,
multiple points of cooperative overlap and commonality shared by the ROC and the
Russian state underscore the breakdown of secularism and church-state separation,
and further suggest that the continued disregard for Russia's constitutional order has
negative implications for the content and development of existing international human rights norms. This emerging church-state collaboration and mutual reliance has

°

8
For example, how will the schools determine what critical mass is necessary before a specific course is made
available to an individual or small group of students? Similarly, in light of Russia's constitutional guarantee that "[n]
obody shall be forced to express his rhoughts and convictions or to deny them", what implications arise from potentially compelling an individual student to self-identifY as a religious minority? Konst. RF art. 29(3) ..
81
Early statistics indicate under-enrollment in the Basics of Orthodox Culture course. See Paul Goble, Russian
Pupils Will Study Ethics and History rather than Religion, Statistics Show, Georgian Daily, Mar. 19, 2010, http:/ /georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17807&ltemid=70; Public council discussed the first
remits ofapprobation ofcomplex educational coune "Basics of religious cultures and secular ethics", supra note 78.
82
Conor Humphries, Russia Church Wants End to Darwin School "Monopoly," Reuters, June 10, 2010.
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been neglected in much of the existing literature analyzing Russian foreign policy.85
Patriarch Kirill today enjoys the ear of Russia's Foreign Ministry and the
Moscow Patriarchate plays a key role in both formulating and advancing Russian
interests abroad. The Church's interest in foreign relations is not limited to the "near
abroad" former Soviet bloc states or its self-declared canonical territory. 86 Rather, the
Church actively seeks to engage with all other states where Russian Orthodox Christians may be living, provided they "voluntarily" join the Patriarchate's jurisdiction_s?
This purview is truly global, covering virtually every country as well as many major
intergovernmental institutions. In Kirill's mind, "The Church acts on equal footing
as a subject of relations with different states and with international public and political organizations. We defend our values and promote the rights and interests of our
congregations." 88
Most of the ROC's effort abroad is managed through its department of external church relations (DECR), which is tasked with the sweeping responsibility of
"maintain[ing] the Church's relations with Local Orthodox Churches, non-Orthodox
Churches, Christian organizations and non-Christian religious communities, as well
as governmental, parliamentary, inter-governmental, religious and public bodies
abroad and public international organizations." 89 In practice, the DECR operates
as a foreign ministry that hosts ambassadors, travels widely, and interacts with the
United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), among others. The Church's foreign policy objectives are multi-pronged and diverse, yet they share a remarkable amount of overlap
with the Kremlin's perspective. As Patriarch Kirill observed in a letter to Foreign
Minister Lavrov: "During your service as foreign minister, the cooperation between
the Russian foreign policy department and the Moscow Patriarchate has considerably broadened." 90 The following section highlights several examples of this broad85 For example, many leading texts analyzing Russian foreign policy make little or no mention of the current role
Orthodoxy or even spirituality plays, limiting their scrutiny to the tsarist period, or altogether omitting any discussion of the close connection between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian foreign ministry. See Jeffrey Mankoff,
Russian Foreign Policy: 1he Return of Great Power Politics (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009) , Olga Oliker, et al.,
Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications (RAND Corporation , 2009) , Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L.
Nogee, The Foreign Policy Of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, 4th Ed ., (M.E. Sharpe, 2009), Robert
Legvold, ed., Russian Foreign Policy In the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past, (Columbia University
Press, 2007), Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity In National Identity, (Rowman
& Littlefield, 2006) , Andrei Melville and Tatiana Shakleina, Russian Foreign Policy In Transition: Concepts and
Realities, (Central European University Press, 2005), Bobo La, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign
Policy (Wiley-Blackwell , 2003), and Michael Mandelbaum, The New Russian Foreign Policy (Council on Foreign
Relations, 1998).
86
Defined to include "Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Estonia." Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow
Patriarchate, 1he Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, art. 3.
87

!d.

88

Church Diplomacy Is Not Just a Matter of !mer-Church Relations, Diplomat, Sept. 2008.
Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Chu rch, DECR Today.
90
Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch KirillS congratulatory message to Russian Foreign MinisterS. Lavrov, Mar. 22, 2010.
89

102

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2008331

ened cooperation and demonstrates how the ROC and Russian government's shared
objectives compromise Russia's secular constitution and respect for human rights
generally, both abroad as well as at home.

A.

"SPIRITUAL VALUES" UNDERPIN RUSSIA'S NATIONAL
SECURITY
One of the central rhetorical pillars of Russia's foreign policy is encapsulated in
the constant if ironic refrain in favo r of "spiritual values." So pervasive is this notion
that it has implanted itself at the apex of Russia's strategic planning documents and
is repeatedly invoked by Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as well as in
speeches by President Medvedev and others. Yet this vague, seemingly nondiscriminatory concept in fact has a very specific and problematic meaning that is discernable in concrete policy ventures implemented abroad, and illustrates a governmental
willingness to further burnish the already glossy-but nevertheless constitutionally
verboten-patina of religious favoritism routinely demonstrated in the context of
domestic affairs.
Russia's National Security Concept (NSC) from 2000 garnered attention for its
unusual emphasis on the need for "spiritual restoration."91 According to this document, Russia faced a dual threat: internally by "the depreciation of spiritual values"
which promotes tension in relations between regions and the center; 92 and externally by "cultural-religious expansion into the territory of Russia by other states." 93
To eliminate these risks, the NSC called for inter alia, protection of the cultural,
spiritual and moral legacy ... the formation of government policy in the field of the
spiritual and moral education of the population, and ... counteraction against the
negative influence of foreign religious organizations and missionaries." 94 Although
the NSC invoked the generic term "spirituality", in substance the policy objective
intended the restoration of Orthodoxy specifically, and to a much lesser degree Russia's other "traditional faiths." Indeed, the NSC went on to brand foreign religious
organizations a "negative influence", despite the fact that many of these religions had
existed in Russia for decades. The ROC had long endorsed this view, painting missionary groups as a threat to "the integrity of [Russia's] national consciousness and
our cultural identity," bent on destroying Russia's "traditional organization of life"
and "the spiritual and moral ideal that is common to all of us." 95
In 2008, the Medvedev government released a revised National Security Strategy
91
Pt. II, National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, Approved by Presidential Decree N o. 24 of I 0 January
2000.
92
Pt. III, !d.
93
Pt. IV. !d.
94 !d.
95
Marat S. Shterin & James T. Richardson, Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Precursors of Russia's New
National Law, in Religious Liberty In Northern Europe In the Twenty-First Century, at 155 n.48 (Derek H . Davis
ed., 2000).
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(NSS) intended to replace the NSC. 96 However, many aspects of Medvedev's plan
embody a clear continuation of Putin's strategic vision. For example, "intelligence
and other activities of special services and organizations, foreign governments and
individuals" 97 is listed as the primary threat to Russia's national security, beating out
even the activities of terrorist organizations. 98 The need to combat this bogeymanostensibly manifested under the guise of foreign religious organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)-through the creation of various bureaucratic
hurdles and other tactics is ripped directly from Putin's playbook and enthusiastically
supported by the ROC. 99
To make more explicit this continuation in policy, Medvedev specifically singles
out the perceived threat posed by religious and other organizations intending to
disrupt Russian unity and territorial integrity, and destabilize the political and social
status quo. 100 Such groups have at various times been labeled as "weapons [of] destruction" designed to promote American geopolitical interests, 101 and more recently,
by a Russian court in the case of Scientology, as extremist and "undermining the traditional spiritual values of the citizens of the Russian Federation." 102 This latter feat is
impressive particularly in the face of a European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
ruling rejecting Russia's decision to deny the same Scientology branches status as a
religious group because they had not existed for at least 15 years in Russia. 103
Even Medvedev's stated belief that the "main idea'' behind his NSS is "security
through development" 104 appears derivative ofPutin's previous approach 105 and

96

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on May 12, 2009 No. 537 "On National Security Strategy of
the Russian Federation until 2020," declares null and void Presidential Decree of 17 December 1997 No. 1300 "On
approval of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation" (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 1997, No. 52, Art. 5909) and Presidential Decree of January 10, 2000 No. 24 "On the Concept of National
Security of the Russian Federation" (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2000, No. 2, Art. 170).
Security Council of the Russian Federation, CTpaTenm Hai..\MOHaJibHOl1 6e3orra CHO CTI1 PoccMl1:CKOl1
<De.nepai..\MM .no 2 02 0 rona, May 12, 2009.
97 Part IV(2)(37), "On National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until2020", supra note 96.

98 Jd.
For more on the Church's relationship to Russia's NGO law, see Robert C. Blitt, Babushka Said Two Things-"It
Will Either Rain or Snow; it Either Will or Will Not": An Analysis of the Provisions and Human Rights Implications of Russia's New Law on Nongovernmental Organizations as Told Through Eleven Russian Proverbs, 40 Geo.
Wash. Int'l L. Rev. I (2008).
100
Part IV(2)(37), "On National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020", supra note 96.
101
Anderson, supra note 3, at 194.
102
UP I, Russia Bans Scientology Literature, Apr. 22, 2010.
103
Church ofScientology Moscow v. Russia, application no. 18147/02, April5, 2007.Scientology now joins the Jehovah Witnesses and the collected works of Said Nursi on Russia's ever-lengthening list of banned extremist materials. As of July 2011, the list included 918 prohibited items (up from 614 items listed in March 2010) . Federation
Ministry of}ustice, <De.nepaJibHb!l1 crrMCOK 3 KCTpeMMCTCKI1X MaTepMaJIOB [Thefederallistofextremist
materials].
104
President of Russia (Kremlin.ru) , Beginning of Meeting with Security Council On National Security Strategy of
the Russian Federation Through to 2020 and Measures Necessary to Implement It, Mar. 24, 2009.
105
Putin's 2000 security strategy mentioned development no less than 20 times. National Security Concept ofthe
Russian Federation, supranote9l.
99

104
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2008331

creates prominent space for the role of spirituality and the ROC. 106 Coincidentally
also in 2009, the ROC and United Russia expressed their intent to "jointly decide ...
what their common values are and what modernization tasks must be accomplished"
in the context of Russia's development plans. 107 The party of Putin and Medvedev
then went on to assert that "Russian modernization should be based on Orthodox
faith."l0 8 Conveniently, Medvedev's NSS lays the groundwork for this by calling for
greater cooperation with institutions of civil society, including religious groups. 109
Medvedev's fallback on spirituality as the adhesive for a coherent national security policy generates significant opportunities for the Church to play an instrumental
role in shaping Russia's national development priorities, and as a natural extension
of this, impacting Russia's security policy and threat perception as well. Notably,
all senior political figures in Russia are speaking from the same set of spiritualityinfused talking points: at an exhibit on Orthodox Russia, Medvedev remarked that
the "lntransient spiritual values of Orthodoxy and other traditional confessions
have always been at the centre of our national identity." 110 During an Orthodox
Christmas Eve meeting with Patriarch Kirill at the ROC's Danilov Monastery, Prime
Minister Putin praised the Church for "educating citizens in a spirit of patriotic love
for their country and passing on a love for spiritual values and history." 111 Speaking
to the OSCE, Russia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs invoked spiritual values
as a component of Russia's security interests. 112 And finally, Foreign Minister Larvov
has explained the Russia government's interest in Orthodox religious sites outside of
Russia as a natural extension of the "spiritual revival ... taking place in Russia, [and]
our return to spiritual values and shrines." 113
To be clear, the ostensibly dogma-neutral concept of "spiritual development"
entails a very particular meaning limited in the main to Russian Orthodoxy. This
is evidenced in the active promotion of government-funded programs such as Days
ofRussian Spiritual Culture, 114 as well as in Russia's 2008 Foreign Policy Concept

106
Remarkably, rwo separate analyses of the 2009 NSS fail to mention even in passing the central role envisioned
for spirituality and culture in guaranteeing Russia's national security. See Marcel de Haas, Medvedev's Security Policy:
A Provisional Assessment, 62 Russian Analytical Digest 2 (June 18, 2009) and Henning Schroder, Russia's National
Security Strategy to 2020, 62 Russian Analytical Digest 6 (June 18, 2009).
107
Church, United Russia want state-church partnership sealed by laws, Inter fax, Dec. I, 2009, [Fact iva DANWS00020091202e5c I OOOry].
108
United Russia considers Orthodoxy as moral basis for modernization, Interfax, Feb 17, 2010.
109
Part IV(3)(52), National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, supra note 96.
110
Medvedev's Wife Visits Exhibition 'Orthodox Russia', !tar-Tass, Nov. 4, 2009
111
Alexandra Odynova and Galin a Srolyarova, Church Calls For Return of Treasures, St. Petersburg Times, May II,
2010.
11 2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Statement by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander
Grushko at the Opening of the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, July I, 2008 (Doc. No. 961-01-072008).
11 3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Interview with
Cyprus News Agency, Dec. 26, 2007.
114
This program is discussed in greater detail in Part III(B)(3) ,below.
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ularism and Religious Freedom

(FPC)ll 5 which, among other things, acknowledges that the Russian government
"actively interacts with the Russian Orthodox Church and other main confessions of
the country" for the purpose of strengthening Russia's international security. 116
The discussion of how "spirituality'' has infiltrated into Russia's national security strategy rhetoric would be incomplete without also examining the connection
between spirituality and culture in Russia's NSS and FPC. From the content of these
documents, it is clear that culture is deemed to include religion, and more particularly, Russian Orthodoxy. This linkage in turn generates additional points of entry
for the ROC, from which it is able to further challenge the secular promise of Russia's constitution. According to the NSS, national security threats within the cultural
arena are exemplified in the domination of mass (i.e. western) culture targeting the
spiritual needs of marginalized groups and the unlawful encroachment on cultural
objects. 11 7 To meet these challenges, the NSS endorses the paramount role of Russian (Orthodox) culture in reviving and preserving moral values and strengthening
the spiritual unity of the multinational people of the Russian Federation. 11 8 The FPC
paints a similar picture, concluding that the increase in cultural and civilizational
diversity necessitates creating a larger role for religion in shaping international relations. To facilitate this role, the document calls for engaging the "common denominator that has always existed iri major world religions." 119 Minister of Culture
Alexander Avdeev makes the equation of Russian culture with Russian Orthodoxy
explicit: "Russian culture will flourish and remain the center of the national idea
only if it will be in very close dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church, if it is
connected with the understanding that the spiritual and historical value are both
sacred values." 120
Confirming the Moscow Patriarchate's intent to take advantage of these entry
points, its Basis ofthe Social Concept already endorses cooperation with the state
in "spiritual, cultural, moral and patriotic education", as well as "culture and the
arts" more generally. 121 For the Church, culture at its essence is religion. 122 Metropolitan Hilarion has called for the "complete destruction of the wall between the
11 5
Part II "The Modern World and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation", The Foreign Policy Concept ofthe
Russian Federation, approved by Dmitry A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, on 12 July 2008.
116
Part III "Priorities of the Russian Federation for addressing global problems", !d.
11 7
Part IV(7)(80), "On National Securiry Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020", supra note 96.
11 8
Part IV(7)(84), !d. The task of strengthening the spiritual uniry of a multinational-and multireligious-people

may strike some as being contradictory. It is also questionable whether the promotion of such a task is rightfully
suited to a secular government.
119 Part II "The Modern World and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation", The Foreign Policy Concept ofthe
Rwsian Federation, sttpra note 115. Use of the term "major world religions" implies an exclusive and discriminatory
approach regarding which groups might reasonably be part of such engagement.
120 Russkiy Mir Foundation, AneKcaH.np Aa.neea: Poccl1i1:CKa5I KynhTypa 6y.neT ycrrernHo
pa3BI1BaTbC5I TOflbKO B COTPY.!IHW-IeCTBe c PyccKoiii rrpaa ocnaBHOi1: 1..\epKOBbiO, ["Alexander Avdeev: Russian culture will flourish only in cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church"].
121 Part Ill(8) "Church and State," Russian Orthodox Church, The Bases ofthe Social Concept, Russian Orthodox
Church: Official Website of the Dep't for External Church Rei.
122
Part XIV(2), "Secular science, culture and education," !d.
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Church and culture that was established in Soviet times," and asserted that "If the
Church does not take part in the country's cultural life, culture is running the risk
of turning into an anti-culture." 123 In a similar vein, Patriarch Kirill has reasoned
that the ROC's parishes abroad "fulfill a cultural mission. They are an important link
between their Motherland and the people living far away from their native country.
The parishes [enable children] to be educated in the spiritual and cultural traditions
of their native country." 124
Feeding into the government's emphasis on spiritual values, spiritual revival, and
spiritual development-or perhaps even as shorthand for all these terms-is the
Russian notion of "spiritual security", 125 a concept embodying efforts to protect Orthodoxy by framing the threat of religious competition from missionaries and "nontraditional" faiths as endangering nothing less than Russia's national security. In part,
this protection is achieved through an alliance between the ROC and the FSB, 126 as
well as the burgeoning relationship with Russia's predominant political party, United
Russia. The ROC is at the vanguard of projecting spiritual security abroad as well:
in its interactions with other "Sister-Churches", the ROC defends "the national
and spiritual identity of Russians"; 127 and through collaboration with the MOFA, it
"protect[s] the spiritual security of the Russian diaspora from non-Orthodox religions
and especially from the spread of secularism." 128 Medvedev has allowed his administration to grow this exclusive partnership significantly. At the 3'd World Congress of
Compatriots Living Abroad, Medvedev approved "the role of the Russian Orthodox
Church and our other traditional confessions in reviving the spiritual unity of compatriots and strengthening their humanitarian and cultural ties with the historical
homeland" and expressed his intent to "certainly continue contacts between the state
and appropriate confessions." 129
The outcome of this ongoing arrangement has the following symbiotic results:
abroad, the government benefits from the ROC's efforts as a willing partner in
123
Senior cleric wges Russian church to play greater cultural ,-ole, RIA Novosti, Mar. 9, 2010. According to the ROC's
Bases ofthe Social Concept, "if culture puts itself in opposition to God, becoming anti-religious and anti-humane and
turning into anti-culture, the Church opposes it." Part XIV(2), "Secular science, culture and education," The Bases of
the Social Concept, supra note 121.
124
Church Diplomacy Is not Just a Matter of Inter-Church Relations, supra note 88.
12
; Anderson, supra note 3, at 194.
126
Julie Fedor, Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition, From Lenin to Putin (Routledge, 2011),
162 and 168.
127
Payne, Spiritual Security, The Russian Orthodox C hurch, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or
Cooptation?, Journal of Church and State, fi rst published online Nov. 9, 20 I 0 (doi: 10.1093/jcs/csq I 02) , at 3.
128
!d., at 8.
129
D ECR, Patriarch Kirill attends the opening of the 3d Congress of Compatriots living abroad, Dec. 1, 2009. Medvedev's inclusion of "traditional confessions" rings hollow here. As part of the Congress, a meeting was held at the
Danilovskaya hotel (within the Danilov Monastery compound, which serves as the patriarch's official residence)
entitled "The Russian Orthodox Church and other traditional confessions in consolidating the united spiritual space
of the Russian World." The substance of this meeting focused exclusively on increasing cooperation between the
MOFA and the ROC abroad. See DECR, 3d World Congress of Compatriots section meeting on 'The role ofthe ROC
and other traditional confessions in consolidation ofunited space ofthe Russian World', Dec. 2, 2009.
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reinforcing Russia's "spiritual security", which in turn boosts available channels for
the projection of Russian power. On the home front, the government ensures that
religious groups or "sects" deemed by the ROC to constitute a threat are sufficiently
repressed. But the potential damage caused by the Russian government's preoccupation with spiritual security runs deeper still. According to Julie Fedor, insofar as
Russia's FSB has "cloak[ed] itself in spiritual rhetoric, [it] will not only attain moral
respectability, but will effectively place itself beyond the reach of any legitimate criticism, scrutiny or control." 130
From this more contextualized vantage point-and even before considering
practical ramifications-it would appear that the theoretical notions of safeguarding
and promoting spiritual development, culture and spiritual security already establish
a conceptual approach to foreign policy and national security that undercuts Russia's constitutionally mandated secularism and separation of religion and state. To
underscore the incongruity of this position, the vast majority of Russia's own citizens
appear to reject restoring and protecting "spiritual" values and culture as an overriding national security priority. According to recent polling data, only three percent of
respondents shared the ROC and government's perspective, whereas eleven percent
considered the economic crisis and weak industry as the major threat facing Russia.131 Despite this reality check, as the next section demonstrates, the government
and the ROC have worked diligently to put their rhetoric into concrete practice
through a variety of tacit and intentional endeavors and partnerships. These tangible
efforts more definitively confirm Medvedev's willingness to encourage an expanded
influence for the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as the enthusiasm both parties have
for intensifying the relationship despite its toxicity for Russia's constitutional directives of secularism, separation of religion and state, and nondiscrimination.
B.

PUTTING "SPIRITUAL VALUES" INTO PRACTICE IN RUSSIA'S
SECULAR FOREIGN POLICY

1.

Russian Orthodox Church-Ministry of Foreign Affairs Working Group

In 2003 a delegation of ROC officials headed by Patriarch Alexy paid their first
official visit to Russia's MOFA. 132 During their inaugural meeting, the two parties agreed to establish an official working group dedicated to developing policies
intended to defend and deepen Russia's "spiritual" values and the ROC's interactions overseas. In Foreign Minister Lavrov's words, the new working group would
enable the Church and Foreign Ministry to work "together realizing a whole array
1
3°

Fedor, supra note 126 at 181.
Opinion poll: Only 3% ofRussians think the lack ofspiritual values to be a major national threat, lnterfax, Jul. 13,
2009. Other threats most cited by those polled included alcoholism, drug addiction, and Russia's shrinking population (9%).
132
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation , Opening Remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at
Press Conference After Tenth Meeting of Working Group on MFA-Russian Orthodox Church Interaction, Nov. 20,
2007 {Doc. No. 1836-21-11-2007).
13 1
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of foreign policy and international activity thrusts," 133 including the maintenance of
cultural and spiritual links with Russians abroad, the upholding of their rights, and
preserving "the cultural and historic legacy of [the] Fatherland and of the Russian
language." 134 Cementing the ROC-MOFA partnership in the form of a permanent
working group struck Lavrov as natural, reflecting "an age-old tradition of Russian
domestic diplomacy." 135
Meetings of the ROC-MOFA working group serve as strategy sessions that
address the planning of the Patriarch's international travels and evaluate the ROC's
activities in international organizations as well as developments in its inter-religious
relations, including with the Vatican. 136 From this vantage point, the Church's
past and future actions are coordinated (and possibly modified) based on implications for-and advantages to-Russia's "secular" foreign policy. In this manner, the
Church and MOFA operate in tandem to advance the state's foreign policy goals,
including, for example, giving the ROC and "traditional" religious values greater
prominence within the international system. 137
At the same time, the existence of the working group is another tangible reminder of the ROC's special treatment, the inequality of other religious faiths, and the
state's failure to abide by its constitutional obligations. This is particularly evident
when the working group's substantive sessions are juxtaposed with the apathetic and
intermittent efforts of MOFA's advisory council on cooperation with Muslim organizations. The latter group has met only a handful of times since its establishment
in June 2007 138 and has limited its discussions to the status and prospects of Islamic
education, and problems encountered by Russian Muslims during the hajj to Saudi
Arabia. 139

2.

The Russkiy Mir Foundation: A Chimera State-Church Foreign Policy
Tool
In addition to the collaboration growing out of the ROC-MOFA working
group, the government and Church have established additional avenues for coating
Russia's foreign policy with a veneer of Orthodoxy. The Russkiy Mir (Russian World)
Foundation 140 is a quasi-governmental institution 14 1 established by Vladimir Putin

133
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Transcript ofForeign Min ister Lavrov Remarks at Orthodox
Earter Reception, Moscow, Apr. 30, 2008, (Doc. No. 605-01-05-2008).
134
!d. Lavrov has described the ROC as nothing less than "a huge mainstay of government actions in this sector."
135 !d.
136
DECR, 0 rrpoae,[(e HMM XI I I 3aCe.[(aHM5! Pa6o'-Ieti rpyrrrrhr n o B3aMMO,[(eticTBMIO

Pycc Ko ti ITpaaocnaaHoti UepKBM M MMHMCTepcTaa

MHOCTpaHH~x

.[(en PoccMtiCKOti

<ll e.[(e p a u MM [13th meeting ofthe Working Group on the Interaction ofthe Russian Orthodox Church and the Ministry

ofForeign Affoirs of the Russian Federation] , June 29, 2009.
137 !d.
138
Diplomacy Needs a Moral Foundation (Interview with Sergei Lavrov) , Diplomat, Sept. 2008.
139 For example, see Russian Mufties Council, Attention to the problems, Mar. 4, 2011 , hrrp:/lmuslim.ru/2/
news/4/1323.htm.
140
The Russian word "mir" also means "peace" and "community".
141
It might also be considered a government-organized NGO, or GONGO.
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in 2007 under presidential decree. The foundation's stated purpose is to "promot[e]
the Russian language, as Russia's national heritage and a significant aspect of Russian
and world culture, and [to support] Russian language teaching programs abroad." 142
More broadly, Russkiy Mir's mission statement provides for "supporting, enhancing and encouraging the appreciation of Russian language, heritage and culture" by
"showcas[ing] vibrant examples of Russian art and culture around the world" in the
form of "artistic, musical, literary, and scientific contribution[s]" by Russia's "talented writers, artists and academics spreading and uniting Russian language and
culture." 143
The Russian government retains significant ties to Russkiy Mir because it operates as "a joint project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science and [is] supported by both public and private funds." 144 At the
foundation's 2009 annual meeting, a statement by Prime Minister Putin hailed the
"close cooperation established between the foundation and the government." 145 To be
certain, this high level of cooperation is ensued by the presence of foreign minister
Lavrov, Andrei Fursenko, Minister of Education and Science, and Sergey Vinokourov, Head of president Medvedev's Office for Interregional and Cultural Relations
with Foreign Countries, on Russkiy Mir's board of trustees. 146
Coupled with its governmental linkage, the foundation also has developed an
increasingly overt connection with the ROC. The Russian language version of the
Russkiy Mir website elaborates no less than 17 main objectives of the foundation
(beyond those cited above), including, at the very end of the list, interaction with
the Russian Orthodox Church and other religions in promoting Russian language
and Russian culture. 147 As an outgrowth of this, much of the content posted to
Russkiy Mir's website is Orthodoxy-driven, consisting of a constant stream of entries
seemingly unrelated to the mandate of advancing the Russian language. These stories
carry headlines such as: "Russia's Patriarch Visits Azerbaijan", 148 "Orthodoxy Should
Become Foundation Of Russia's Life - Patriarch Kirill" 149 , "Russian Pilgrimage Center To Open In Jordan This Autumn", 150 "European Population Will Die If It Fails
To Come Back To Its Spiritual Sources- Patriarch Kirill", 15 1 and "Patriarch Kirill
142

!d.

143 Russkiy

Mir Foundation, "About Russkiy Mir Foundation: Mission Statement".
Russkiy Mir Foundation, "About Russkiy Mir Foundation: C reation".
14 5
Russkiy Mir Foundation , The Third Russkiy Mir Assembly: Summary of Results, Nov. 9, 2009.
146
Russkiy Mir Foundation, "Board of Trustees".
147
Russkiy Mir Foundation, "0 <I>OH.[Ie" ["About the Foundation"]. There is no parallel reference to the ROC on
Russkiy Mir's English language webpage.
148
Russkiy Mir Foundation Information Service, Russia's Patriarch Visits Azerbaijan, Apr. 26, 20 I 0.
149
Russkiy Mir Foundation Information Service, Orthodoxy Should Become Foundation Of Russia's Life - Patriarch Kirill, Jul. 19, 2011.
150
Russkiy Mir Foundation Information Service, Rwsian Pilgrimage Center To Open In jordan This Autumn, Jul. 12,
2011.
15 1
Russkiy Mir Foundation Information Service, European Population Will Die If It Fails To Come Back To Its
Spiritual Sources- Patriarch Kirill , June 23 , 20 II .
144
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Interested In Space Travel." 152
As noted, Russkiy Mir is ostensibly focused on the seemingly secular task of promoting the Russian language and related teaching programs abroad. 153 At the time of
its inception in 2007, no ROC representative was included either on the founding
executive staff or board of trustees. 154 Despite this apparent disconnect, Putin's 2000
NSC explicitly foreshadowed the linkage between language and Russia's "spiritual
renewal" now embodied by Russkiy Mir:
The spiritual renewal of society is impossible without the preservation of
the role of the Russian language as a factor of the spiritual unity of the
peoples of multinational Russia and as the language of interstate communication between the peoples of the member states of the Commonwealth
of Independent States. 155
The NSC's vision demonstrates that the ROC's connection to Russkiy Mir is
not a stroke of kismet, but rather part of a longstanding, long-term vision originally
espoused by Putin and continued today under the Medvedev administration: Orthodoxy shall be promoted not only under the banner of an ostensibly more inclusive
notion of spirituality or culture, but also as part of the government's broader effort
to safeguard the Russian language. Taking a deeper look at Russkiy Mir's most recent
interactions with the ROC, it becomes obvious that the relationship is intensifying
as the foundation drifts away from its core mission of promoting the Russian language and wanders into the realm of disseminating an exclusively Orthodox version
of spirituality and Russia culture abroad.
At the end of2009, Russkiy Mir and the ROC entered into a formal cooperation agreement intended to solidifY systematic collaboration. This milestone agreement calls for inter alia "strengthening the spiritual unity of the Russian world," 156
preserving the "spiritual, linguistic and cultural identity" of Russians abroad, 157 and
promoting structures created by the Moscow Patriarchate overseas, 158 including or-

"' Russkiy Mir Foundation Information Service, Patriarch Kirill Interested in Space Travel, Dec. 2, 20 I 0.
153
Decree ofthe President of the Russian Federation on the Establishment ofthe Russkiy Mir Foundation, June 21, 2007.
Original Russian: YKa3 llpe3M.l(eHTa PoccMiiiCKOiil <l>e.l(epaQVIVI 0 C03.l(aHVIVI <iJOH.l(a " PycCKVIiil
MMp" (Moscow, June 21, 2007 No. 796).
154

!d.

155

Pt. IV, National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, supra note 91.

156 lKypHanw 3aCe.l(aHV!R CBRII\eHHOro CVIHO.l(a OT 2 5 .l(e Ka 6p5I 2 0 0 9 r o.l(a [Holy Synod Jour-

nals, Dec. 25, 2009). See also http:/lwww.sedmitza.ru/news/903430.html, and Russkiy Mir Foundation, "Agreement
on cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Foundation 'Russian World'".
157
Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, llO.liiTV!CaHo cor n a rn eHMe o
COTPY.liHVI~ecTBe

Me*.liY PyccKoiil llpaBocnaBHOiil U epKOBb~

VI

<iJoH.l(OM «PyccKMiil MV!p»

[An agreement on cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Foundation "Russian WOrld'J, Nov. 3,
2009.
158
Russkiy Mir Foundation, 3aK n~~ eHO co rn arneHMe Me*.liY rraTpV!apxoM KV!pMnnoM M <iJoH.l(OM
«PyccKV!iil MV!p» [Agreement between Patriarch Kirill and "Russian WOrld" Foundation], Nov. 3, 2009.
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ganization of tours to Orthodox pilgrimage sites outside of the Russian Federation.159
The agreement also acknowledges the importance of the ROC's foreign activities, 160
mandates that ROC representatives will be appointed to Russkiy Mir's grant making council and board of trustees, 161 and establishes a permanent ROC-Russkiy Mir
working group. 162
The newly minted and far-reaching formal alliance between Russkiy Mir and
the ROC places the Kremlin in a constitutionally untenable position. As a consequence of its direct financial and political support for the foundation, the Kremlin
has created and sanctioned a proxy body that represents nothing less than a fusion of
Orthodox and state institutions. Consequently, this chimera body-originally tasked
with the modest goal of showcasing examples of Russian art and culture abroad-today embodies how gravely respect for secularism and religious equality has deteriorated within the context of Russia's foreign policy priorities.

Support for Days of Spiritual Culture: ''A Little Door, Tiny and
Unnoticeable; and-Lo!-Faith Appears"
One of the projects to emerge from the ROC-MOFA working group is the
"Days of Russian Spiritual Culture." This program, part of a broader "Days of Russia'' public relations initiative launched by the Russian government, is operated
with support from Russia's MOFA, the Ministry of Culture, and the ROC, among
others. 163 To date, the program has been a traveling roadshow of sorts, held in over a
dozen states including Serbia, Croatia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and
Chile. 164 In 2010, the Vatican hosted a similar program, which included an "international theological forum ... devoted to the common Christian roots of the Roman
Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Churches and the common tasks they are facing
in today's Europe." 165
According to Foreign Minister Lavrov, the "Days of Russian Spiritual Culture"
program offers "a series of meetings, exhibitions, film showings and concerts ... and ...
joint divine services" 166 to help acquaint others with Russian spiritual culture. Putting aside the question of whether the foreign ministry is operating ultra vires of
3.

159
An agreement on cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Foundation "Russian World" ,
supra note 157.
160

!d.

161

Agreement between Patriarch Kirill and "Russian World" Foundation, supra note 158. At present, the Orthodox
Church enjoys a monopoly as the sole religious organization bestowed with a seat on the foundation's board of
trustees. Metropolitan Hilarion, Chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations,
represents the Church in this capacity. "Board ofTrustees", supra note 146.
162
An agreement on cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Foundation "Russian World",
supra note 157.
163
Russkiy Mir Foundation, Days of Russia to Take Place in Latin America for First Time, Oct. 9, 2008.
164
Latin America to celebrate the Days of Russian Spiritual Culture, lnterfax, Sept. 30, 2008. See also Days of Russian Spiritual Culture in Serbia, The Voice of Russia, Sept. 15, 20 I 0.
165
Vatican to hold Days ofRussian Spiritual Culture, Inter fax, Feb. 12, 20 I O.See also Russkiy Mir Foundation Information Service, Days ofRussian Spiritual Culture Kick offin Vatican, Feb. 12, 2010.
166
Transcript of Foreign Minister Lavrov Remarks at Orthodox Easter Reception, supra note 133.
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Russia's constitution by actively promoting religious services, Lavrov's description
conveniently ignores the fact that the program is wholly Orthodox in orientation
and directly pairs the Moscow Patriarchate with the state to the exclusion of all other
faiths existing in Russia today. 167
More accurately, a program organizer describes the Days of Russian Spiritual
Culture exhibit as designed to generate "positive public opinion" about the reunification of the ROC and the ROCOR, and highlight the revival of Orthodoxy and the
restoration of its holy sites in Russia. 168 A press release-coincidentally published by
Russkiy Mir-explains that the "exhibition highlights the life of Russian churches
roday and spiritual development in society, the revival of sacred sites and the historic
significance of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia and its reunification
with the Moscow Patriarchate." 169
Beyond concerts by the Sretensky Monastery Choir for the "secular public",
the Foreign Ministry's sponsorship of the program has facilitated sales of orthodox
literature published by the Moscow Patriarchate 170 and "the introduction of modern
Russian Orthodoxy to believers in Latin America." 17 1 When viewed from ground
level, the Foreign Ministry's support for "Days of Russian Spiritual Culture" has in
fact embroiled the Russian government directly in the work of supporting ROC
proselytizing abroad. Father Alexy Aedo, a Chilean native and Orthodox archpriest,
lauds the program for
help[ing to] draw [people] closer to the Orthodox faith because during . ..
the Days of Russian culture, Chileans have had the chance to converse
with clergy-with priests and hierarchs .. . people may be very far from the
Church ... until they become acquainted with a priest. The Lord God literally opens for them a little door, tiny and unnoticeable; and-lo!-faith
appears. 172
In addition to actively sponsoring the ROC's missionary efforts, the "Days of
Russian Spiritual Culture" also advances Russia's temporal foreign policy. According to Dmitry Kravtsov, director of"Russia House" in Buenos Aires, the program is

167
Remarkably, Lavrov in the same breath goes on to describe Russia as having "for centuries existed as a multinational and multiconfessional society." !d.
168
Latin America to celebrate the Days of Russian Spiritual Culture, supra note 164.
169
Russkiy Mir Foundation, Days of Russian Spiritual Culture start at Vatican, May 19,2010. See also Days of Russia to Take Place in Latin America for First Time, supra note 163.

170 B flaTJ1HCKOi1: AMep11Ke npoi1:,l:lyT .[(Hl1 pyccKoi1: .r\YXOBHOi1: KYJibTypb!, [Days ofRussian Spiritual Culture to be Held in Latin America] Imerfax, Sept. 29, 2008.
171
Russkiy Mir Foundation, Days ofRussian Spiritual Culture to Take Place in Latin America, Sept. 29,2008, http ://

www.russkiymir.org/ en/ news/ !index. php?from4= I 09&id4=3963.
172
Hieromonk Paul Scherbachev, Opening a Door for the Lord in People's Hearts: An interview, XIII(!) The Voice of
Orthodoxy, Jan-Feb 2009.
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important because it works to strengthen Russia's public diplomacy abroad. 173 Mixed
in with the icons and clergy, activities include sessions on promoting regional cooperation, strategic partnership and profitable investments. 174 From this perspective,
the "Days of Russian Spiritual Culture" initiative crystallizes the synthesis between
Russia's foreign policy objectives and the active propagation of Russian Orthodoxy.

4.

Facilitating an Exclusive Podium for Russian Orthodoxy on the
International Stage

Sponsoring a UN Exhibit on the Spiritual Revival of Russia
The Russian MOFA also has sought to establish a prominent role for the Moscow Patriarchate within a variety of UN fora. Similar to the "Days or Spiritual Culture" program described above, Russia's Permanent Mission to the UN sponsored an
exhibit at UN Headquarters in New York entitled "Russian Orthodox Church and
Interreligious Dialogue: Spiritual Revival of Russia." 175 While the title purported to
emphasize "interreligious dialogue", the event's production and content reflected a
transparent effort to undercut Russia's constitution and legitimate ongoing discrimination against so-called "nontraditional" religions in Russia. Remarks at the opening
ceremony by then Patriarch Alexy glaringly excluded thousands of believing Russian
citizens by proclaiming "we, Russian Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Judaists, and
Buddhists, live in peace. And at the heart of this peace is our respect for each other's
traditions, ways of life and social models." 176
Not to be outdone, Vitaly Churkin, Russia's Permanent Representative to the
UN, affirmed this exclusionary and disingenuous view when he boasted that his
Mission "wanted to show how modern Russia is addressing the challenging task of
promoting interreligious and intercultural understanding." 177 This brash statement
came only months after the ECtHR ruled that Russia's effort to deny re-registration
to the Salvation Army on the basis that it was a "paramilitary organization" amounted to an unjustifiable interference with the right to freedom of religion and association under the European Convention on Human Rights. 178
i.

173 .[(HM pyccKol1 .n;yxoBHol1 KYJibTYPb! B apr eHTMHCKOiir npOBMHL\MM CaHTa-Kpy3 [Days of
Russian Spiritual Culture In the Argentine Province ofSanta Cruz] ,http:/ /www.pravoslavie.ru/news/3400 l.htm and
Dfas de la cultura espiritual msa en la provincia Santa Cruz [Days ofRussian Spiritual Cultttre in the Province ofSanta
Cruz], Feb. 2, 20 I 0, http:/ /www.casaderusia.org/ar/ficha-evento.php?idxevent=62.
174
Days of Russia to Take Place in Latin America for First Time, supra note 163.
175
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, On the opening at the UN Headquarters of the photo
exhibition "Russian Orthodox Church and Interreligious Dialogue: Spiritual Revival of Russia'', Oct. 8, 2007.
176

!d.

177

Talking Points by H .E. Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United
Nations, at the opening of the photo exhibition "Russian Orthodox Church and Interreligious Dialogue: Spiritual
Revival of Russia", http:/ /www.un.int/ russia/ new/MainRoot/ docs/press/041 007 eprel.htm (undated).
178
The Cou rt inter alia found "no reasonable and objective justification for a difference in treatment of Russian and
foreign nationals as regards their ability to exercise the right to freedom of religion through participation in the life
of organised religious communities." , 82, Case ofthe Moscow Branch ofthe Salvation Army v. Russia, (Application
no. 7288 1/01), Judgment, Srrasbourg, Ocr. 5, 2006 (Final, Jan. 5, 2007) {internal notes omitted).
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ii.

Pushing for a Consultative Council of Religions
During the UN General Assembly's 62"d session, Foreign Minister Lavrov
labeled the "spiritual and moral foundations of human solidarity" increasingly vital
and proposed "establishing under the UN auspices, a special forum-a kind of
consultative Council of Religions-for the exchange of views among representatives
of major world confessions." 179 Since this time, Russia has consistently and repeatedly advocated in favor of such a council across a variety of international fora, 180 as
part of a methodical effort to increase the points of entry available to the ROC on
the international level and in turn boost the projection of Russian state power. For
example, the desire to establish a religious council has been a prominent selling
point in Russia's bid to bolster ties with the Muslim world. In 2008, Lavrov invited
the Organization for the Islamic Conference (OIC) to support Russia's UN initiative, framing the need for the council in the context of the "legitimate and growing
role of the religious factor in the modern-day international relations." 181 One former
Indian diplomat familiar with the region described the move as a "major political
initiative", elevating Russian standing in the Muslim world to a "qualitatively new
level." 182 Soon thereafter, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim states embraced Russia's
proposal as part of the fourth forum of the "Strategic Vision Group: Russian and
the Islamic World." 183 1he final communique issued by the group-which included
representatives from the ROC 84-not surprisingly adopted a recommendation to
endorse the Russian government's proposal for a consultative council. 185
While international interreligious cooperation may be a laudable objective, it is
important to recognize that Russia's implementation of such an endeavor is rooted
in its own skewed and exclusionary domestic vision for religious dialogue and intended to serve as a vehicle for boosting its own political power within a "polycentric"

179
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Address By Sergey V. Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, Sept. 28, 2007.
180
See Russia's Foreign Minister answers your questions excl usively, RT, Apr. 30, 2009 , and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Transcript of Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the XIV World
Russian People's Council, Moscow, May 25, 20 10, (Doc. No. 719-25-05-2010). As if to confirm how closely the
ROC and MOFA operate on the foreign policy level, it was the ROC rather than MOFA that set out for UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon "the essence of Russia's proposal to create a consu ltative council of religions under the
aegis of the UN." Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Visit to the Russia of UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon, Apr. 14,2008, (Doc. No. 483-14-04-2008).
181
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Points of the address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation Mr. S. Lavrov at the XI Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, March 13,
2008.
182
M. K. Bhadrakumar, Russia challenges US in the Islamic world, Asia Times Online, Mar 29, 2008.
183
The Strategic Vision Group was established in 2006 "to broaden cooperatio n between Russia and the Muslim
countries." The group held its fifth meeting in December 2009. Kremlin .ru, Dmitry Medvedev sent his greetings to
delegates and guests ofthe fifth meeting of the Russia-Islamic World Strategic Vision Group, Dec. 21, 2009.
184
Russia-Islamic World group backs Russia's proposal to set up UN religious council, Interfax, Oct.31, 2009.
185
Recommendation 5, Strategic Vision Group: Russia and the Islamic World, Final Communique ofthe Fourth Forum of the Strategic Vision Group: Russia and the Islamic World (King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz initiative for interfaith
and intercultural dialogue: a new vision for international relations) , Oct. 29, 2008.
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international system. 186 President Medvedev himself has confirmed this approach,
stressing that such consultations "should help to address important issues such as the
settlement of interreligious conflicts, [and] combating defamation of religions ... " 187 :
"Russia has its own place in the sun and unique experience of interreligious dialogue,
experience which has accumulated over centuries ... we believe that this is very advantageous; it has helped us create a great country ... where the fundamental rights of
religious denominations are respected, where civil peace and harmony reign." 188
This gross distortion of Russia's actual track record in the context of religious
freedom, fundamental rights and tolerance is, not surprisingly, echoed by the ROC
in its effort to preach the virtues of adopting Russia's model on the global level. According to Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, head of the ROC's department for churchsociety relations, Russia's example of inter-religious harmony "is in demand in the
world which increasingly understands that it is necessary to respect different civilizations with their religious or secular roots, their laws, rules, social models and political
systems." 189 Yet the ROC plainly asserts that any cooperation with international bodies, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), can only be achieved "on condition of constructive interaction with
traditional religious communities" exclusively. 190 In other words, before any "dialogue"
can commence, minority and "nontraditional" faiths, as well others, must be left by
the wayside or permitted merely as token participants. 19 1
The Russian MOFA's continued advocacy of this type of international pseudointerreligious engagement ratifies the discriminatory status quo that persists within
Russia's domestic context and reinforces the government's unwillingness to respect

186
Transcript of Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the XIV World Russian People's Council,
supra note 180.
187
Kremlin. ru, Dmitry Medvedev met with Director-General of UNESC O Koichiro Matsuura and members of the
high level group fo r interreligious dialogue under the aegis of UNESCO headed by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and
All Russia, Jul. 21, 2009.
188
Dmitry Medvedev, Opening Remarks at Meeting with Director-General of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Koichiro Matsuura and Members of the High Level Group for Interreligious Dialogue under the Aegis of UNESCO's Director-General, Kremlin .ru, Jul. 21, 2009.
189
A Russian priest visits Saudi Arabia for the first time, lnterfax, Oct. 29, 2008.
190
Russian Patriarch urges UNESCO to cooperate with religious communities, lnterfax, Oct. 20, 2009.
19 1
Sergei Lavrov has expressed his conviction that only the "main world religions" can restore the "common moral
denom inator" underpinning the concept of rights, and that "harmonious development of all humanity is impossible
without this." Minister ofForeign Affoin of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov addresses the XV Assembly ofthe Council on Foreign and Deftnse Policy (Mar. 17, 2007), Info-Digest
M". 2 1, 2007, at 5. For example, consider the ROC's decision to break off a 50 year "dialogue" with the Evangelical
Church in Germany (ECG) followin g the election of Bishop Margot Kaessmann as head of the Church Council.
Archbishop Hi/arion's answers [sic} questions from Der Spiegel, Dec. 14, 2009, http:l/www. mospat.ru/en/2009112114/
newsl0180.
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its constitutional obligations. 192 More problematically still, on the international level,
such activities undermine existing international human rights norms by denying
equal and nondiscriminatory treatment to all religious groups, and underpin a larger
effort to upend traditional international human rights norms by generating political
space for promoting, inter alia, a ban on "defamation" of religion 193 and the downgrading of other recognized rights in light of so-called "traditional" and "religious"
values. 194
iii.

Sponsoring and Endorsing Patriarch Kirill's Tirade Against Universal Human
Rights
In between lobbying the UN and its individual member states for the establishment of a consultative council on religions and sponsoring Russia's "spiritual"
renewal in lockstep with the ROC, the Russia MOFA also facilitated a key speech by
then Metropolitan Kirill to the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). In March 2008,
the HRC held a discussion entitled "Intercultural Dialogue on Human Rights", "[a]
ctively supported by the Russian Federation and Russian Orthodox Church." 195
Metropolitan Kirill took this opportunity to lament his belief that:
The human rights approach has been .. . used to justifY the outrage against
and distortion of religious symbols and teachings .. . to impose a certain
course of introduction to various religions in schools instead of teaching
the basics of their own religion .. .In addition, there is a strong influence of
extreme feministic views and homosexual attitudes to the formulation of
rules, recommendations and programs in human rights advocacy, which
are destructive for the institution of family and reproduction of population.196
Further on in his address, Kirill stressed the need for a relativistic approach to
192
It also further evidences that the preambularly distinction berween "traditional" and so-called "non-traditional"
religions established under the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience has achieved legal recognition. See Arina
Lekhel, Leveling the Playing Field for Religious "Liberty" in Russia: A Critical Analysis ofthe 1997 Law "On Freedom
of Conscience and ReligiottS Associations, "32 Van d. J. Trans nat' I L. 167 ( 1999) . 0 Svobode Sovesti i o Religioznikh
Objedinenijah [On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations], art. 4(4), Sobranie Zakonodatel'srva
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection ofLegislation]l997, No. 39, Item 4465 (Federal Law
No. 125-FZ).
193
For more on the challenge presented by the effort to enshrine a ban on defamation of religion, see Robert C. Bliu,
The Bottom up Journey of"Defamation of Religion" from Muslim States to the United Nations: A Case Study of
the Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas, in Special Issue Human Rights: New Possibilities/New Problems (56
Studies in Law, Politics, and Society I) , 121-211 (Austin Sarat ed., 2011).
194
UN Human Rights Council, Promoting human rights andfundamental .freedoms through a better understanding
oftraditional values ofhumankind, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/21, Oct. 12, 2009. Human Rights Watch labeled the
resolution "divisive and dangerous" and "a cause for concern." Human Rights Watch, UN Human Rights Council:
'Traditional Values' Vote and Gaza Overshadow Progress, Oct. 2, 2009.
195
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, lntercultttral Dialogue on Human Rights Discussion at the
7th Session of the UN Human Rights Council (Press Release), Mar. 21, 2008, (Doc. No. 366-21-03-2008).
I% The address of Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate DECR
on the panel discussion on Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue at the 7th session of UN Human Rights
Council, Interfax, Mar. 18, 2008.
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international human rights, one that ought to be "implement[ed] ... taking into
account the cultural distinctive features of a particular people." 197 In closing, the
Metropolitan (as he then was) called for the fundamental moral norms of "major
world religions" to inform the development of international law as a means of avoiding "alienation and opposition of a considerable part of humanity to the [existing]
global processes." 198 Shortly after the speech, the Conference of Non-Governmental
Organizations in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations (CONGO)
Sub-committee on Freedom of Religion and Belief decried the fact that "no government had criticized Metropolitan Kirill's dismissive remarks about multi-cultural
education and also about the rights of women." 199
What is most remarkable about Kirill's railing against 60 years of human rights
development (to say nothing of his ignorance concerning the diversity of views
included in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), is the fact
that the Russian government went out, of its way to publicize the event, in essence
elevating Kirill to the status of government spokesperson. A survey of 150 "InfoDigests" published by Russia's Permanent Mission to the UN between 2007 and
2010 reveals that Kirill's speech was the only non-governmental event ever reported
by that office. 20° Further augmenting the impression that the Metropolitan's words
carried the weight of state sanction is the fact that Russia's delegation in Geneva, in
addition to promoting the address through its office, took the time to Xerox Kirill's
speech onto the Permanent Mission's official government letterhead for circulation
in both paper and electronic format. 20 1 Likewise, the Information and Press Department of Russia's Foreign Ministry distributed Kirill's speech in its entirety, and
supplemented it with a separate press release excerpting highlights from the Metropolitan's address.202

"' Id.
198 Jd.
199
CONGO Committee on Sub-committee on Freedom of Religion and Belief, Draft Minutes ofMeeting of22 April
2008.
200
The author conducted the survey based on the list of"Info-Digests" available from Russia's Permanent Mission
website. The period covered runs from March 15, 2007 to May 18, 2010. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, Digests, http://www.geneva.mid.ru/digests/
digests.html.
201
A copy ofKirill's address on the Permanent Mission's letterhead is on file with the author.
202
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, B&rcTynrreHMe npe):1Ce):1aTem:r 0T):1erra
BHelliHMX uepKOBH~X CBH3eM MOCKOBCKOrO naTpMapxaTa MMTpOnOITMTa CMOJ1eHCKOrO 11
KarrMHMHrpa):1cKoro K11p11rrrra Ha naHerrhHOM ):111CKyccMM 7-M ceccMM CoBeTa OOH no
npaBaM ~erroBeKa «Me*KYIThTYPH~M .1111arror no npaBaM ~erroBeKa», *eHeBa , 1 8 MapTa
2 0 0 8 [Speech by the Department for External Church Relations ofMoscow Patriarchate Metropolitan Kirill ofSmolensk
and Kaliningrad on the Panel Disci/Ssion, 7th Session ofthe UN Human Rights Council, "'ntercultural Dialogue on Human Rights'; Geneva, March 18, 2008], Doc. No. 36 1-20-03-2008, Mar. 20, 2008, and Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation, 0 B~CTynrreHMM MMTponorrMTa K11p11rrrra Ha 7-M ceccMM CoBeTa
OOH no npaBaM ~ erroBeKa [On the Statement by Metropolitan Kirill at the 7th Session ofthe UN Human Rights
Councin, Doc. No. 359-20-03-2008, Mar. 20, 2008.
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5.

Secular Bear

Enlarging the ROC's Presence Abroad

Another way the Russian government has put the rhetoric of spiritual values
into practice is manifested in its intimate involvement in enlarging the ROC's
physical and geographic reach abroad. Perhaps most dramatically, President Putin
played an instrumental role in ending the 80-year schism between the ROC and the
long-estranged Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR). 203 The merger
brought the ROCOR's 400 parishes and 400,000 members worldwide within the
fold of the Moscow Patriarchate. As the Wall Street Journal observed at the time,
"The [ROC] gains influence in the U.S., Western Europe and South America, where
it had little presence. Mr. Putin also gains. The [merger] blunts what has been one of
his largest group of critics-Church Abroad clerics who regularly attacked his policies and human-rights record." 204
Although the accord ostensibly preserves the ROCOR's autonomy in organizational and economic matters, this assurance has proven inadequate for assuaging
the concerns of many ROCOR clergy205 and parishioners who believe the Moscow
Patriarchate has failed to adequately address its legacy of KGB infiltration206 or sufficiently insulate itself against current Russian government interference. On this latter
point, it is instructive to note Foreign Minister Lavrov's observation that the signing
of the Act of Canonical Communion heralded "a new stage in our efforts to consolidate the Russian World" and a means of ensuring stability and a "just world order." 207
More directly, President Medvedev welcomed the Moscow Patriarchate's growing
significance as a force for securing Russia interests abroad, and pointed to the ROCROCOR merger as the first step in consolidating Russia's "near abroad":
We support the Church's efforts to strengthen the fraternal ties between
Russia and its close neighbours. We are separated by national borders but
we share a common past and common historic destiny ... [The reunification of the ROC and ROCOR] gave decisive impetus to consolidating
the Russian world, making our ties with our compatriots all around the
globe stronger than ever. 208
In Medvedev's view, part of strengthening ties with compatriots abroad means
ensuring a local foothold for ROC churches and clergy. Accordingly, the Russian
government has been a strong proponent of building new Orthodox churches and
203
David Holley, Russian Orthodox Split is Mended, L.A. Times, May 18, 2007. The split occurred in the 1920s
when members of the Russian Orthodox faith severed ties with the Moscow Patriarchate in response to Patriarch
Sergy's decision to swear loyalty to the communist government.
204
Suzanne Sataline, Cold War Lingers At Russian Church In New jersey, Wall St. Journal, July 18 2007, at AI.
205
Estimates put the number at almost one third of ROCOR's clergy pre-merger. See Sataline, !d., and Alexander
Osipovich, Pushing 2 Churches Closer to Each Other, Mosc. Times, Feb. 12, 2008.
206
Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West (2009), at 225226 (discussing the KGB's "nearly total control" of the ROC "both at home and abroad.").
207
Diplomacy Needs a Moral Foundation, supra note 138.
208
President Omitry Medvedev, Speech at a Reception Given by the President of Russia in Honour of Senior Clergy
Who Took Part in the Russian Orthodox Church Local Council (Feb. 2, 2009).
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pursuing ownership claims against property currently maintained or controlled by
Russian Orthodox communities that have either grown estranged from the Moscow
Patriarchate or are actively affiliated with the Constantinople or Ecumenical Patriarchate. 209
New Orthodox churches are being built across the globe, situated in farflung and often strategic locales such as Africa, 210 Argentina, 211 China, 212 Tokyo,
Havana, 213 1hailand,2 14 Madrid, 215 and the United Arab Emirates. 216According to
Patriarch Kirill: "our parishes [abroad] fulfill a cultural mission. They are an important link between their Motherland and the people living far away from their
native country." 21 7 But Kirill has also opined that new churches operate as "another
bridge to unite" Russia with other nations. 218 To be certain, the construction of new
churches represents more than a just a facility for providing spiritual succor to an
Orthodox Russian flock now living in a global village. As journalist Geraldine Fagan
has observed, "One of the very few things the Soviet government ever encouraged
the Russian Orthodox Church to do was promote national interests abroad." 219 And
this is precisely what ROC churches abroad are doing today. In the words of one
high-level Russian government official, new church construction is "a very important
event even for Russia's secular power." 220
To be certain, the ROC does not undertake the impressive task of building new
onion-domed churches singlehandedly. Russia's MOFA is virtually omnipresent in
the Church's construction efforts abroad. Sergei Lavrov has stated that the MOFA
and its diplomatic missions abroad "comprehensively help the expansion of the pres-

209
See Alicja Curanovic, The Attitude of the Moscow Patriarchate towards Other Orthodox Churches, 35(4)
Religion, State & Society 301-318 (Dec. 2007). See also Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin wants Russia to become "Byzantium without irs faults", Interfax, Feb. 29, 2008, (According to Chaplin, Byzantium "has reincarnated in Russia.")
210
Patriarch Kirill intends to open Russian parishes and build churches in Africa, Interfax, Apr. 12, 2010.
211
A new Russian church to be constructed in Argentina, Interfax, Nov. 7, 2008.
2 12
Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, An Orthodox church consecrated in
the territory ofRussian embassy in Beijing, Oct. 13, 2009.
2 13
Orthodox Church spreads Kremlin's word, Intelligence Online, March II, 2010 (Facriva Doc. No. INTON00020 100414e63b0000e).
2 14
The ROC consecrated its second church in Thailand, located in the resort town ofPanaya, in December 2009.
Archbishop Hi/arion consecrates new Russian church in Thailand, RIA Novosri, Dec. 12, 2009.
2 15
Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian Orthodox Church to be
given a plot ofland for building a church in Madrid, June 24, 20 I 0.
2 16
First RttSsian Orthodox Church in the Arabian Peninsula Consecrated, AsiaNews.it, June 8, 2011, http://www.asianews. ir/ news-en/First-Russian-Orthodox-church-in-the-Arabian-Peninsula-consecrated-21773 .hrml.
217
Payne, supra note 127, at 6.
2 18
Patriarch Kirill believes new Russian parishes likely to appear in Larin America, !nterfax, Sept. 21, 2009.
219
Geraldine Fagan, Russia's ambitious new Patriarch, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.opendemocracy.ner/arricle/email/
russia-s-ambirious-new-parriarch.
220
Purin's visit to UAE to consolidate RF's positions in Arab world, Organization of Asia Pacific News Agencies,
Sept. 4, 2007.
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ence of the Russian Orthodox Church." 221 What this means more specifically, Lavrov
explains at length:
The Foreign Ministry of Russia actively helps communities of the Russian
Diaspora, even to meet their spiritual needs. And, whenever our compatriots say they want to build a church, we begin working on the matter in
close cooperation with [ROC] leaders ... and the host country concerned.
This is also so when it comes to transferring the property rights to temples
that are monuments of Russian culture and faith back to Russia. We proceed from the assumption that the establishment of spiritual life is one of
the key factors in the well-being of the Russian Diaspora. 222
The most prominent recent example of this commitment came in February
2010 when the Russian government "went to extraordinary lengths" 223 to emerge as
the highest bidder for a two acre plot of land abutting the Seine River in downtown
Paris, "a deux pas de fa tour Eiffe/." 224 Despite president Medvedev's office publicly
pitching the project as a generic "spiritual and cultural center", all other indicatorsincluding a 2007 meeting between President Nicolas Sarkozy and then Patriarch
Alexy 11 225- point to the upmarket property as being earmarked for exclusive use as
a Russian Orthodox Church226 and "seminary for educating priests." 227 Indeed, the
Russian government's international architectural competition that closed in October
2010 more candidly sought the "best design" for a "Russian Orthodox Religious
and Cultural Center. . .intended as a place for meetings, cultural events and spiritual
nourishment for the Russian community and for introducing Parisians to the Russian Orthodox culture."228 The construction cost for the winning design announced
in March 2011 is estimated at upwards of $50 million dollars, 229 while the purchase
221
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Interview with RIA Novosti on Russian Relations with the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, Nov. 17,
2008 , (Doc. No 1830-17-11-2008), http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070fl28a7b43256999005bcbb3/40d
ff6a7982643e5c3257523003f9fl9?0pen (emphasis added). The interview also underscores the secular importance
and relevancy of Latin America for Russian foreign relations.
222
Diplomacy Needs a Moral Foundation, supra note 138.
223 Among other steps, it "employed a French lobbying firm ro get across the message: the Kremlin would consider a
sale to anyone else an 'unfriendly act'." Matthew Campbell, Onion domes to rise in Paris, The Sunday Times, June 6,
2010 (Factiva Doc. No. ST00000020100606e666000fs).
224
Vincent Jauvert, L'affoire de Ia cathidrale du Kremlin a Paris, NouvelObservateur, May 28, 2010. Russia's bid
bested two other rivals, Canada and oil rich Saudi Arabia. Irina Filarova, Kremlin Acquires Plot Alongside Eiffil Tower,
The Moscow Times, Feb. 9, 2010.
225
Jauvert, supra note 224.
226
Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, A Russian Orthodox church to be
built in downtown Paris, Feb. 9, 2010.
227
Ptttin thanks France for decision to build Russian spiritual center, ITAR-TASS World Service, June 11, 20 10 (Factiva
Doc. No. TASS000020100611e66b001e3).
228
Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, International contest for best
design of Russian Orthodox Religious and Cultural Center announced in Paris, Oct. 1, 2010.
229
Henry Samuel, Domed Russian Orthodox cathedral to be built at foot ofEiffil Tower, The Telegraph UK, Mar. 18,
2011, http://www.telegraph .co.ukl news/worldnews/ europe/france/8390743/Domed-Russian-Orthodox-cathedralto-be-built-at-foot-of-Eiffel-Tower.html.
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price of the land acquired by the Russian government has been pegged at nearly
$100 million dollars. 23°
Plainly, the Russian government's commitment to this decidedly high-priced
transaction demonstrates its utter disregard for the constitutional propriety of
expending state funds abroad to promote a single privileged faith. 23 1 It also confirms
the fact that in its view, the term "spirituality" translates not into "traditional" Buddhism, Islam or Judaism (to say nothing of other so-called "nontraditional" faiths),
but rather into Orthodoxy alone to the exclusion of all others. The government's
decisive action in this case also begs the further question: precisely what interest is
advanced by building a landmark Russian Orthodox Church in a city where the
majority of Russians-immigrants from the Bolshevik revolution-already have a
church, and in any case are affiliated with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and thus do
not recognize the Moscow Patriarchate's jurisdiction?232 This conduct is rendered
more dubious against the backdrop of hundreds of rural churches in Russia lying
in disrepair and hundreds of thousands of Russian Orthodox parishioners living in
poverty. 233
The government's active support for repossessing old churches and building new
ones underscores that these facilities are not mere houses of worship; rather, they
operate as concrete manifestations of Russia's willingness to avail itself of the Church
as a potential lever of soft power. As a means of further facilitating this relationshipand expanding its own geographic reach-the Moscow Patriarchate appears willing
to contravene its own doctrine of "canonical territory", an ecclesiastic rule which
posits the principle of "one city-one bishop-one Church." 234 Daniel Payne observes that the "establishment of multiple churches in a single territory goes against
the ecclesiological basis of the Orthodox Church." 235 However, this is precisely what
the ROC is poised to do in a variety of locales. The manner in which the ROC has
pursued the establishment of churches abroad betrays that the strategy is in no way
intended to be limited or restricted to the narrow rationale of providing "full-fledged,
effective spiritual support to its flock." 236 As noted above, one of the express purposes
of the new Orthodox Church planned for Paris is to share Orthodox "culture" with
Parisians at large, not only existing Orthodox parishioners. In fact, the ROC has
exhibited a tendency to stray beyond even the most generous reading of canonical
2
3° Jauvert,

supra note 224.
The government will provide the Moscow Patriarchate with exclusive use of the property at no charge. Alexander
Soldarov, lll:vtpOKO!llaraeTrrpaBoc n aBHa.m ..lepKoBh [Wide Stridesfor the Orthodox Church], Novaya Gazeta,
No. 18 Feb. 19, 2010.
231

232
233

!d.
!d.

234 Bishop Hilarion (Alfeyev) , "One city-one bishop-one Church". The Principle of Canonical Territory and the
Appearance of "Parallel Hierarchies", 84 Europaica Bulletin, Jan. 23, 2006.
235
Payne, supra note 127, at 14.
236
Patriarch Alexy II, The Russian Orthodox Church in the Modern World: The International Activity of the Russian Orthodox Church, 55 lnt'l Affairs 2 (2009) (Moscow, All-Union Society "Znaniye").
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confines, expressing open support for assisting ethnic Russians in election campaigns
to legislative bodies in the European Union 237 and working to "establish a political
dialogue between [President Medvedev's] United Russia party and the conservative
forces of Europe and the USA." 238
IV.

A VICIOUS

CIRCLE: INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO DEGRADE
HUMAN RIGHTS REINFORCE RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AT
HOME
The Orthodoxy-tinged foreign policies currently advocated by Russia and the
Moscow Patriarchate augur grave implications for the scope, coherence and enforcement of existing international human rights norms. In essence, these policies demonstrate a willingness to constrain freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief,
and reduce the free exchange and expression of ideas on a global level. Furthermore,
by insisting on a role for so-called "traditional values" in informing universal human
rights norms, Russia has sanctioned the unlocking of a relativistic Pandora's box full
of detrimental practices such as female genital mutilation and discrimination against
women and religious minorities-to say nothing of Orthodox traditional values that
reject rights for homosexuals, "non-traditional religions", and others. As Patriarch
Kirill has asserted: "The [Orthodox] religious tradition ... contains a criterion for
discerning good from evil. From the perspective of this tradition, the following cannot be accepted as normative: mockery of sacred things [i.e. blasphemy], abortion,
homosexuality, euthanasia and other actions that are actively advocated today by the

concept ofhuman rights." 239
Meanwhile, the government and ROC energetically use the challenge mounted
against human rights law on the international level to legitimate further hostility
towards these norms at home. This is evident across a variety of areas, including
discrimination against religious and other minority groups, and the prosecution
of "defamation of religion" offenses. For example, Patriarch Kirill continues to
denounce gay pride parades as a "blatant display of sodomy" that "degenerates
public morality." 240 In 2010, the ROC "welcome[d] solidarity between the government and society in rejecting sex minorities' attempts to hold a gay pride parade in
Moscow." According to the Moscow Patriarchate, the gay pride parade-banned
in Moscow since 2006-symbolizes a challenge to "the values of traditional religions ... [designed] to erode the clear borderlines between the good and the

237

Whitmore, mpra note 40.
Russian Church to help expand dialog between United Russia and wes tern conservatives, Inrerfax, May 31, 20 I 0.
239
Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad: Human Rights and Moral Responsibility: Part 3
•'"'' read at the Tenth World Russian People's Cou ncil "Faith. The Person. The World. Russia's Mission in the 21st
Century", Europaica Bulletin, No. 97, May 23, 2006, http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/97.aspx#3, (Translation
from Russian by Deacon Basil Bush) (emphasis added).
240
Ann-Dorit Boy, Pride In Moscow, Der Spiegel, May 12, 2009.
238
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evil." 241 Despite an ECtHR ruling that Russia's ban violated rights to free assembly
and nondiscrimination,242 the government-with ringing endorsement from the
Church-continues to dispatch police forces to break up gay rights protests and
related gatherings. 243
Russia's efforts to promote an international norm prohibiting defamation of
religion also lend legitimacy to the government's parallel willingness to prosecute
related offenses under the guise of incitement in domestic courts. The ROC continues to be a steadfast proponent of such laws as well as the organization that primarily
benefits from its enforcement. For example, one art exhibition entitled "Forbidden
Art" landed the organizers in court, where a judge branded the arrwork on display "a public offense to Christianity" 244 and concluded the organizers were guilty
of inciting hatred.245 1his trial, "allegedly instigated by elements within the Moscow Patriarchate",246 followed the heels of a similar lawsuit filed against a 2003 art
exhibit entitled "Caution, Religion!". 247 In the latter case, after an "organised group
of self-professed Orthodox believers" 248 ransacked the exhibit, 249 the state opted to
prosecute the exhibit's organizers for "inciting hatred and enmity" under the same
provision of Russia's Criminal Code. 250 At trial, the prosecution led testimony from
six expert witnesses, none of whom had a background in contemporary art. 251 The
court convicted the defendants and fined each in the amount of $4,000. On appeal,
the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment in its entirety. 252

V

CONCLUSION

In the short timespan of three years, the Medvedev-Kirill partnership has
opened multiple new channels of influence for the ROC in Russian social and political life, handed the Church its long-coveted prizes of access to the public education
system and the military, and continued to entrench a discriminatory three-tiered
status system for religious groups. Much of this activity is premised on rhetori241

Russian Church supports ban on gay pride parade, lnterfax, May 31, 20 I 0. Until President Medvedev deposed him
in 2010, Luzhkov was a longstanding supporter of the Moscow Patriarchate.
242
Case ofAlekseyev v. Russia (Applications nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09), Judgment, Strasbourg, Oct. 21,
2010 (Final, Apr. II, 2011).
243 Over 30 gay parade supporters, opponents arrested in central Moscow, RIA Novosti, May 28, 20 II, and Church
grateful to city authorities for preventing Moscow gay parade, Inter fax, May 22, 20 II.
244
Forbidden Art-2006 exhibition organizers to pay fine, RIA Novosti , Jul. 12, 2010.
245 The organizers were sentenced to pay fines totaling $12,000. Joanna Impey, Russians convicted over Forbidden
Art show, Deutsche Welle, Jul. 12, 2010. Amnesty International labeled the verdict "yet another blow to freedom of
expression in Russia." Laetitia Peron, Russia convicts art experts over exhibition, AFP, Jul. 12, 20 I 0.
246
U.S. Comm'n on lnt'l Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2010, supra note 61, at 282.
247
The ECtHR admissibility decision provides additional details regarding the actual content of the exhibit. Samodurov and Vasilovskaya v. Russia (Decision as to admissibility) , Application no. 3007/06, Dec. 15, 2009.
248
!d., at 3.
249 A district court deemed that this did not amount to a criminal offense. !d., at 5.
250
This decision came despite an initial investigation that concluded there was insufficient evidence to show the artists' requisite intent to publicly display their work. !d.
251 Quoted in !d., at 7-8.
252 !d., at II.
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endorsement of"spiritual values"-or more accurately Orthodoxy-as a glue
national security and Russian identity. These growing channels of influence are
111 v·~~· ~ by a burgeoning-if similarly constitutionally suspect-role for the ROC
in the formation and execution of foreign policy. This latter ROC-state partnership-manifested in efforts to supplant universal human rights norms and give
credence to the belief that certain select religions merit greater influence than others
in the formulation of international rules-indicates that the Kremlin's disregard for
constitutionally-mandated separation of church and state generates negative implications on the international level as well. Moreover, espousal of these international
policies in turn reverberates within Russia's domestic realm to exacerbate an environment already hostile to human rights.
Ultimately, the current ROC-state dynamic-premised on the creeping infusion of religiosity and discriminatory treatment into official state policy-leaves both
parties as deliberate collaborators in the ever-worsening collapse of Russia's constitutional order and respect for human rights. Disturbingly, this relationship also carries
the toxic risk of compromising the Church's post-Communist independence and
bringing about a return of the subordination of the Russian Orthodox faith to the
Kremlin's political diktats. Given this state of affairs, the church-state relationship
is likely to prove a critical focal point as Russia moves towards 2012 presidential
elections. To maintain its privilege of place, the Moscow Patriarchate likely will
be expected to rally behind Putin's orchestrated return to power in 2012, and also
potentially open itself up to greater government control and influence. At the same
time, Putin is likely to further incentivize the ROC in exchange for securing its
public endorsement as well as for the validating function it will play in blessing the
pretense of democratic rule in Russia.

125

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2008331

FIDES ET IBERTAS
2011
SECULARISM AND
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

International Religious Liberty Association
12501 Old Columbia Pike
Silver Spring, Maryland 20904-6600, United States of America
Phone: +301.680.6686 Fax: +301 .680.6695
E-mail: lnfo@IRlA.org Web site: www.IRLA.org

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2008331

FIDES ET LIBERTAS
THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ASSOCIATION

12501 Old Columbia Pike
Silver Spring, Maryland 20904-6600, USA
Phone: 301.680.6686 Fax: 301.680.6695
www.IRLA.org

John Graz, Publisher
Barry W Bussey, Editor
Gail Banner, Production Assistant
Lisa Clark Diller, Book Review Editor
Natasha Pinczuk, Copy Editor
Lindsay Sormin, Graphic Design/Layout Editor

Statements of fact in this issue of FIDES ET LIBERTAS are those of the authors
as they understand the facts. The views expressed by the authors are their own
and do not necessarily represent the International Religious Liberty Association.
Copyright © 2011 International Religious Liberty Association. All rights reserved.

Price US$10.
This periodical is indexed in the ATLA Religion Database(r), a product of the
American Theological Library Association, 300 S. Wacker Dr., Suite 2100,
Chicago, IL 60606, USA. email: atla@atla.com, http://www.atla.com.
ISSN 1940-6924

7
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2008331

